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and the lack of political capitol for Prime Minster Blair in 2005 are the best explanations 
for the divergent responses. 
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CHAPTER I
 
INTRODUCTION
 
1. Overview 
On September 11,2001 the Al Qaeda terrorist organization hijacked U.S. airlines 
flights United 175, American 11, and American 77 and flew them into the World Trade 
Center Towers in New York City and the Pentagon in Arlington, Virginia. United 
Airlines Flight 93, hijacked by four AI Qaeda terrorists was thwarted by passengers 
aboard, and crashed in the fields Shanksville, Pennsylvania. Close to three thousand 
Americans were killed in total, making it the worst terror attack in U.S. history. In the 
months after 9-11, U.S. policymakers came together to craft several changes to its 
domestic security structure and processes. Before the fall of2001, security reforms had 
been discussed, but most of the recommendations were not acted upon until 9-11 put 
domestic security atop the political agenda. 
It has been recognized that the attacks on September 11, 2001 ushered in a new 
era in international affairs and a turning point in U.S. national security (Sarkesian, 
Williams, and Cimbala 2002).1 A Pew Research Center Poll conducted shortly after 9-11 
shows widespread agreement between the U.S. and countries from across the globe. 76 
1 Congressional actions reflect the idea that 9-11 fundamentally changed the way America looks at the 
world. 9-11 removed the illusion that the V.S. was invulnerable from attack and the V.S. Congress and 
Administration were shifting V.S. resources and policy efforts accordingly (Kapp and Lum 2003, 1). 
2 
percent ofthose polled from Western Europe, and 90 percent of those polled in the 
Middle East and Latin America considered the events of 9-11 a turning point in world 
history. In Foreign Policy William Dobson relates the post 9-11 reaction of the majority 
of scholars and policymakers saying, "rarely have so many agreed about the meaning of a 
single moment" (2006). Similarly, when describing the U.S. policy changes 
implemented in the years after 9-11, scholars widely agreed the response taken by the 
Bush Administration was brash, aggressive, and massive in scale. Civil liberty concerns 
associated with the controversial USA Patriot Act, the unilateralist approach in invading 
Iraq, the detention policies at Guantanamo Bay, and the largest US government 
reorganization in more than a half a century via the Homeland Security Act of2002 are 
referenced in support ofthese claims (Schulhofer 2005,1; Powell 2004, 273; Firestone 
2002, AI). Although the impact from the post 9-11 U.S. policy changes has been 
criticized, the idea the overall U.S. policy response was immense after the 9-11 attacks is 
rarely questioned. 
Yet, after the United Kingdom endured a large-scale coordinated attack on 
London's transit systems on July 7, 2005--causing the deadliest terror attack on British 
soil (Kfir, 2006)--the response regarding the significance of this terrorist event and the 
magnitude of the British policy response has been surprisingly mixed. The 7-7 attacks, 
which have been called Britain's "version of9/11," occurred when four coordinated 
bombings rocked three of London's subway trains and one bus during evening rush hour 
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(Gardiner and Phillips 2005).2 In total, the bombings killed 56 people and injured more 
than 700 others (State Department Country Report, 2006). As in the U.S. after 9-11, calls 
for change reverberated throughout U.K., increasing the pressure on the British 
government to put forth significant security reforms. Commentary dealt with the 
resilience of the British people and the swift actions ofBritain's first-response teams. 
Scholars viewed the attack as another reminder that no country was safe from terror-
even one with a reputation for maintaining excellent domestic security agencies. The 
wide-ranging response over the significance of the London bombings was best typified 
by the British citizens themselves. In opinion polls after the 2005 bombings, Britons 
indicated they had more "satisfaction with [Tony] Blair's performance as a leader in the 
wake of the bombings," while at the same time polls revealed over 60% ofBritons 
thought its government's policy in Iraq raised the risk of terror attacks in the U.K. 
(Archick 2005,5). Thus, unlike the impact of9-11, there was no widespread agreement 
about the "meaning of the moment" after the London attacks. 
The impact of the British government's subsequent policy actions was equally 
diverse. Like President Bush, Prime Minister Tony Blair was accused by civil 
libertarians and Muslims of aggressively pushing through policies which were "far too 
stringent" (Kfrr 2006). Scholars reference the massive Iraq demonstrations, the 2006 
Terrorist Act Legislation which extended the length of time suspects can be held without 
charge, and the controversial House Arrest plan proposed by then-Home Secretary 
2 Two weeks later, a coordinated attack on London's subway was carried out, but only the bombs' 
detonators went off, resulting in no citizen casualties. Al Qaeda claimed responsibility for both the 7-7 and 
7-21 incidents (Gardiner and Phillips 2005). 
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Charles Clarke (Kfrr).3 To many outside observers, the British domestic security 
apparatus was still seen as strong even in light of the bombings and news that their 
counterintelligence agencies badly misinterpreted the terror threat.4 
At the same time, in comparisons of British and U.S. counterterror policies before 
and after the London Bombings, Great Britain was often grouped with Europe,5 who was 
criticized for not doing enough to counter terrorist attacks, and for making changes that 
were not equal to those implemented in the U.S. after 9-11 (Dalgaard-Nielsen 2004, 
160).6 Although most European countries and Great Britain demonstrated support 
towards the U.S. after 9-11,7 divisions about how their countries should respond to the 
attack, and how they actually did respond, continued among scholars and policymakers. 
Robert Kagan's (2003) contention there was a gap of 'strategic cultures' between the 
USA and Europe tied into the literature comparing the size of domestic security changes 
3 The stiff resistance Blair faced in Parliament in 2006 over the arrest provision illustrates how Blair faced 
more resistance passing security legislation after 7-7 than Bush after 9-11. 
4 A month before the London bombings, the Joint Terrorism Analysis Center (JTAC), a group composed of 
high ranking counterterrorism officials, issued a memo which stated, "At present there is not a group with 
the current intent and capability to attack the UK." Martin and Jones concluded this memo represented an 
intelligence failure and "a wider failure" in communications among government agencies, academics and 
analysts, and the media about the nature of the British terror threat (2006). 
5 The U.K. has been grouped with the Europeans in this debate, but due to Britain's strong support for the 
u.s. after 9-11, their role in the 2003 invasion of Iraq, and their more stringent terror legislation, they are 
distinguishable from their European counterparts in comparisons as well. 
6 Although there was debate over the u.K. 's counterterror strategy, 9-11 did cause the British government 
to acknowledge they needed a new and dramatic response to combat the threat (Shapiro 2004). 
7 The close relationship was further cultivated as President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Blair 
became united on the "War on Terror" (Gardner 2007). After the 9-11 attacks some policymakers and 
scholars in the U.K. felt the attack marked a new age in terrorism requiring drastic policy changes, while 
others saw it as an isolated incident which called for a less urgent response. It is true Tony Blair and his 
government "made a strategic choice to stand by the U.S." after 9-11, but "some U.S. critics question the 
extent to which the European allies share U.S. threat perceptions ofthe challenges posed by Islamist 
terrorism" (Archick 2007; 2006a). Other European nations and the European Union are often used in the 
security comparisons, but for the purposes of this paper, I will be focusing on the actions taken specifically 
in the U.S. and Great Britain. 
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implemented in Great Britain and the United States. Many Americans believed Britain 
was too soft on terrorism, while Britons felt the U.S. abandoned the rule of law (Jacobsen 
2006, XV)8 
Great Britain's specific post-London policy changes were also seen by some as 
small in comparison to the post-911 U.S. changes. Policy analysts claimed the British 
government did not undergo a massive security reorganization following the London 
Bombings comparable to the U.S. response. The Congressional Research Service (CRS) 
and the influential British think-tank, The Chatham House, both agree there is no UK 
equivalent to the U.S. Department of Homeland Security with responsibilities over all 
aspects ofhomeland security and counterrorism (Archick 2006 et aI., 36, 38; Cornish 
2007, 10). A Cato Institute report issued in 2005 claimed, "Since July 7, the Blair 
government's response has been surprisingly measured" (Basham). 
To clear up the uncertainty, this thesis compares the major policy changes 
implemented in the U.S. two years after 9-11, and in Great Britain following the London 
bombings to determine how the two democratic governments responded after each were 
hit with the largest domestic terrorist attack in their countries' history. Were the changes 
made to the U.S. domestic security infrastructure after 9-11 as sweeping as most scholars 
have claimed? And how do the changes made by the British government following the 
London bombings stack up in comparison? Investigating the major policy changes in the 
U.S. and U.K. can help determine if the assumptions about the size of the U.s. response 
8 The current domestic security literature which compares U.S. and Great Britain's anti-terror policies is 
rapped up in the debate between U.S. and European scholars over which side is stronger in their fight 
against terrorism. The thesis does not seek to resolve the discussion about whether the U.S. or the u.K. 
has done more in the fight against Islamic extremists, but it is important to note because the comparative 
security texts largely emanate from these issues. 
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are valid, and also will help clear up ambiguity about the post 7-7 British policy response 
as well. 
Since there is debate about the magnitude of the U.S. and British post-attack 
changes, deciphering what major legislation changed in each country is of initial 
importance. Thus, a central component of this thesis is devoted to uncovering what 
actually changed in the U.S. and Great Britain after the two attacks. In order to do this, 
and because Great Britain made significant changes prior to 9-11, the first section 
compares the pre-bombing reorganization changes of the domestic security agencies in 
each country. This way, when the post-bombing changes are analyzed, the potentially 
unbalanced strength between the U.K. and U.S. domestic security agencies will be 
accounted for. 
2. Further Need for Analysis 
While the security literature is filled with debates over the effectiveness of recent 
U.S. and U.K. security changes, nobody has compared the changes undertaken in the U.S. 
after 9-11 with those implemented in Great Britain after the London bombings. The 
disparate level of casualties stemming from the two attacks--Over 2,000 from 9-11 and 
over 50 from London bombings-and the fact that only two years has passed since the 
London bombings are possible reasons why this study has not been conducted previously. 
As a consequence, no established critique of the magnitude/significance of change taking 
place after the respective attacks exists in the security literature. 
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There is also no consensus within the academic field on a theory to explain the 
different post-attack policy changes in the U.S. and Great Britain. Therefore, the last 
section of the thesis will address scholar's common rationales to explain the changes and 
explanations not referenced in the literature. The section includes the author's 
viewpoints about the central theories along with a discussion regarding the most likely 
explanation for why we see the particular post-attack changes. 
3. Why Important 
Gaps in Literature 
Because there have been few studies using the London bombings as a central 
component in a case study, this thesis intends to help bridge the gap between policy 
analysts and political scientists within the security field. "Certainly a 'gap' exists 
between much of the theory produced by political scientists in academic settings and the 
knowledge needs ofpolicy specialists" (George and Bennett 2005,265). In the US, 
programs are being established in colleges across the country to help produce scholarly 
research in the areas ofhomeland security. This thesis will continue the trend of 
expanding the domestic security literature in the United States, and with my introductory 
knowledge in the field ofpolitical science, attempt to bridge gaps in the literature as well. 
Improve Dialogue between Countries 
The majority of recent comparative security literature has focused on rifts in the 
alliance between Great Britain and the U.S.,9 and more can be done to improve 
communication between the two countries. "Lost amid this often-heated rhetoric are the 
9 The divide largely stems from the U.S. and British backed invasion of Iraq in 2003. 
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significant commonalities between the United States and several European countries in 
the terrorism arena" (Jacobson 2006, xv). Finding ways to share ideas on improving 
intelligence and security functions is a crucial aid in the fight against terrorism for both 
the U.S. and Great Britain, and by analyzing the policy changes implemented after 
similar-styled attacks, this thesis looks to improve the information and facilitate dialogue 
on both sides of the Atlantic. 
Crucial Elements in U.S. /U.K. Comparison 
RAND scholars Peter Chalk and William Rosenau describe the benefit of 
comparing the U.S. and British security policies in their book The Enemy Within. Chalk 
and Rosenau see the U.S. and Britain as having similar characteristics such as "(1) liberal 
democratic traditions, (2) a common concern with stemming threats to domestic stability 
through robust internal security infrastructures, and (3) acceptance of the need to balance 
operational effectiveness in the fight against terrorism with the concomitant requirement 
to respect fundamental norms integral to the effective functioning of an open society" 
(xv-xvi). These traits, to Chalk and Rosenau "make it useful to consider how each state 
has organized its respective counterterrorist capabilities, if only as a benchmark for 
guiding possible developments in the United States." In Lessons ofDisaster, Thomas 
Birkland said a major reason for writing his book about whether "big events have 
influence on policy change," was "because the implicit mechanism of focusing events is 
that they reveal in some way the need for policy change" (2006, xv-xvi). A case study 
comparing the British and American security changes following similar styled terrorist 
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attacks should provide benchmarks for developments in both countries and reveal how 
each country needed to change their domestic security systems. 
The changes implemented after the London bombings were chosen because out of 
the European countries, Great Britain has been acknowledged as being the most 
aggressive in their counter-terror policies since 9-11. Therefore, their potential post­
attack response should provide the best test for a comparison with the seemingly strong 
U.S. response. 
Rise in Terrorism 
Finally, this project is a useful endeavor because terrorism has significantly 
increased worldwide over the last few years. According to the RAND terrorism incident 
database funded by DHS, "Surveying incidents for the period January 1998 through 11 
August 2006 shows that the rate of terrorism fatalities for the 59 month period/allowing 
11 September 2001 is 250 percent that of the 44.5 month period preceding and including 
the 9/11 attacks" (Conetta 2006).10 
4. Methodology Brief 
This thesis will compare the policy changes in the U.S. and Great Britain by 
evaluating the important legislation, executive orders, government reorganization, and 
spending totals relating to reforming domestic security in the U.S. and Great Britain. 
One domestic security definition was used for both countries to select the appropriate 
legislation and narrow the scope of the analysis which will be explained below. To 
10 "This figure has been adjusted to account for the different length of the two periods and it implies an 
increase in average monthly fatalities of 150 percent. (Only in January 1998 did the database begin to 
include both national and international terrorism incidents)" (Conetta). 
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determine what the major changes were in the U.S. and Great Britain, the author used 
tests based off ofDavid Mayhew's methods in Divided We Govern. The central sources 
used to compare the changes were the laws passed in U.S. Congress and British 
Parliament exactly two years following the two attacks, government spending reports, 
and important end of the year summary articles from the major British and American 
newspapers. To compare the magnitude of change the documents also included major 
security and political science journals, think tank publications and seminars, government 
white papers, and commission reports from U.S. Congress and British Parliament. The 
results ofthis study will be presented through the description of the "major" domestic 
security changes in the U.S. and Great Britain in the post-attack section. 
5. Organization of Thesis 
Including the introduction, the argument consists of six total chapters/sections. 
Section II will set the stage for the post-disaster changes by comparing the American and 
British security development and policy enactments made prior to the two attacks. 
Comparing how and when these countries made important organizational changes in the 
years prior to the bombings will help determine how advanced each countries' security 
infrastructure was at the time of the attacks. Section III begins with a detailed review of 
the research methodology. The post-attack section revealing the "major" security 
changes in both countries serves as Section IV, and as the primary results portion of the 
thesis. The researcher uses the extensive literature devoted to dissecting the U.S. and 
British post bombing policy changes as a means to synthesize the most important changes 
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in both countries. Section V reviews the findings of the study. The section explains the 
notable distinctions between the size of the two country responses. It serves to recount 
the important claims made by scholars about the magnitude of the overall changes in the 
U.S. and Great Britain while also providing the author's own analysis of the results. In 
Section VI the author explains the most common rationales for why the U.S. changes 
were seen as larger than Britain's post-attack changes. This section includes the author's 
critiques about which explanations seem the most logical. The concluding Section VII 
recounts the author's final explanations for why there is a different level of change in the 
U.S. and Great Britain and makes suggestions for additional research on the topic. This 
thesis will be a success if it aids future domestic security researchers in their own efforts. 
6. Definitions 
Before proceeding further a definition of "domestic security" needs to be 
established. II Counter-terror has been a central concern ofthe U.S. government since 9­
11 after President Bush declared a "War on Terror". As fighting terrorism has become a 
bigger industry the dividing lines between domestic and foreign activities have become 
increasingly interrelated (Korologos 2005). Therefore, it is important to establish a clear 
distinction between domestic and foreign agencies. For the purposes of this thesis, 
agencies dealing with domestic security efforts12 are ofprimary importance as opposed to 
the foreign military or intelligence functions of the American or British armed forces and 
II The phrase "homeland security" was not used here as it is an uncommon term in Great Britain and 
Europe. Their understanding ofhomeland security is much broader than the U.S. version (Sarotte 2005, 
34) 
12Such as the U.S. Department ofHomeland Security, FBI, and Britain's Security Service (MI-5) and 
National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC). 
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spy agencies. 13 To decide which issues fall under the domestic realm, I am using the US 
government definition and agenda as it corresponds with the National Strategy for 
Homeland Security. The US. government defines homeland security as "the domestic 
effort (as opposed to the overseas war on terrorism) to defend America from terrorists" 
(Sauter 2005, xiv). The definition ofhomeland security also falls under the "all hazards 
doctrine," which encompasses general preparedness for natural or accidental catastrophes 
such as hurricanes and chemical spills (Sauter), but this paper focuses on the counter­
terror efforts in particular. 
The three strategic objectives in the Strategy for Homeland Security are to prevent 
terrorism, reduce vulnerabilities, and minimize damage/recover from attacks. Preventing 
terrorism calls for improving intelligence, border and transportation security, and 
improving functions of domestic law enforcement agencies (domestic counterterrorism). 
Reducing vulnerability focuses on "protecting critical infrastructure" and preventing 
terrorists from acquiring weapons ofmass destruction. Minimizing damage deals with 
the ability ofthe US. to respond to an attack on our country which focuses on improving 
training and resources for local and state "first responders" (Sauter 2005, xv). 
Britain's counterterror strategy called CONTEST, was released in 2003 and 
addresses similar objectives to the American National Strategy. CONTEST is based 
around the "four Ps"-preventing terrorism by tackling its underlying causes, pursuing 
terrorists and those who sponsor them, protecting the UK public and interests, and 
13 The Secret Intelligence Service (MI-6) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) are the primary 
foreign counter-intelligence units in Great Britain and the United States respectively. 
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preparing for the consequences of any attack" (O'Connor 2006).14 Therefore, for the 
purposes ofthis thesis, "domestic security" is defined as the "domestic efforts by the U.S. 
and British government to defend America and Great Britain from terrorism." Domestic 
security entails efforts by both countries to "prevent terrorism, reduce vulnerabilities, and 
minimize damage and recovery from attacks" (Sauter 2005, xv). Issues falling under 
these categories are defined as "domestic security" matters. 
This definition of "domestic security" was used when comparing and evaluating 
the major laws, events, reorganizations, and spending efforts undertaken by the British 
and American governments before and after the two bombings. The thesis applies the 
same broad definition throughout, including when comparing the magnitude ofchange in 
each country. Magnitude of change was classified in the amount ofvariance in the 
number of major additions or alterations to domestic security policies, organizational 
structure, budget totals and overall functions. Legislation and agencies, tasked with 
addressing issues falling under the domestic security definition are the changes being 
compared in this research effort.1s 
14 The specific content of the CONTEST strategy can be found at: 
15 A more comprehensive description explaining how major legislation was selected can be found in the 
methodology section below. 
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CHAPTER II 
PRE-BOMBING COMPARISON OF DOMESTIC SECURITY 
STRUCTURESINEED FOR CHANGE 
Comparing data using events with unequal starting points is a central obstacle in 
any research endeavor. In this case, the U.K. was seen to have a stronger and more 
advanced domestic security organization in place in 2005 than the U.S. had in 2001. 
During the four year gap between the two attacks, the British government made several 
important changes to their domestic security structure which further strengthened their 
system prior to the London bombings in July of2005. Therefore, before comparing the 
level of post-disaster responses in the U.S. and Great Britain following the 9-11 and 2005 
London bombings, we must fIrst recognize how and why the starting points were 
distinctive for the U.S. government in September of2001 and for the U.K. in July of 
2005. 
As mentioned earlier, the U.S. is widely assumed to have made more sweeping 
changes after 9-11 than Great Britain after 7-7, and the disparate need to change is 
commonly cited as justification for this discrepancy. Comparative articles following the 
9-11 attacks reference Britain's impressive domestic security apparatus as the U.S. 
sought to learn from its more experienced ally. In the four year interim, Britain learned 
from 9-11 and implemented several new security laws of their own. This section serves to 
describe the status quo as of 9-11 which the rest of the post-bombing change will be 
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evaluated against. In addressing the two countries' divergent starting points, we can 
more confidently evaluate the post-attack changes and reasons why the magnitude of 
change may have varied. 
The first part of this section compares the general structure of the domestic 
security arrangements in Great Britain and the US. as of2001. The important agencies 
in place in both countries are briefly explained, with an emphasis on the institutional 
differences set in place even before 9-11. Next we'll see how experts judged the security 
situation and capability (need to change) of the major counter-terror organizations in the 
US prior to 9-11, and Great Britain before the London Bombings.16 In the final portions 
of this section, the author uses 9-11 and Britain's major reforms to highlight the different 
degree ofchange in the US. prior to 9-11, compared with the UK. before the 7-7 attacks. 
After reviewing government reports, statements from scholars, security experts, and 
policymakers, the author explains how the two countries' perceptions oftheir security 
needs are relevant to discussing the post-attack changes that followed. 
1. Domestic Security Agencies and Leadership Responsibilities 
Understanding the key structural differences between the U.S. and UK. domestic 
security organizations will help elucidate the post-attack changes in the upcoming 
sections. Prior to the 9-11 attacks, government officials in the U.S. and Great Britain 
recognized their domestic security agencies needed to change and adapt to the new 
16 As Britain made more changes prior to the 2005 attack than the U.S. before 9-11, there will be more 
information concerning British legislation in this section. Alternatively, in the post-bombing changes 
section, the U.S. legislation is lengthier than the British portion. 
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international order following the end of the Cold War. The United States held the 
position as the preeminent global power in the 1990s. Yet, it was the United Kingdom 
who made changes to their domestic security systems at a faster rate than the United 
States leading up to 9-11. The author compares and describes some of the reasons we see 
organization differences in the U.S. and U.K. The roles of corresponding agencies will be 
analyzed side by side, with differences emphasized throughout the section. 
The U.S. and U.K. intelligence agencies provide the fIrst institutional comparison. 
In a recent Senate Appropriations Hearing, John Y00 said the "most important British-
American difference...which can have signifIcant effects on the war on terrorism is the 
structure of the domestic intelligence agencies" (2006). The similar intelligence 
agencies/positions in the U.S. and U.K. include the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 
and the British Security Service (MI-5); U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the 
Secret Intelligence Service (MI_6),17 National Security Agency (NSA) and the 
Governmental Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) in Great Britain (National 
Intelligence Machinery; Masse 2003, 4). The British Home offIce and Home Secretary 
are also related in function with the U.S. Departments of Justice and Homeland Security 
(Lewis 2006). 
Federal Bureau a/Investigation (FBI) and Security Service (MI-5) 
The FBI is the United States' domestic security agency serving investigative, law 
enforcement, and domestic counterintelligence functions (Jordan and Taylor 1999, 153). 
17 Less attention will be devoted to the responsibilities of the MI-6 and the CIA since they deal primarily 
with foreign affairs matters. 
17 
The Security Service is also responsible for Britain's domestic intelligence functions, but 
MI-5 plays a more supportive role with police and law enforcement agencies to protect 
and prevent major crime (National Intelligence Machinery), whereas the FBI combines 
its domestic intelligence and law enforcement roles (Masse 2003, i). MI-5 works most 
closely with the "Special Branches" of the United Kingdom's 56 police forces 'explicitly 
responsible for countering terrorism' (Masse). 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Secret Intelligence Service (MI-6) 
The CIA and MI-6 are used to gather secret intelligence relating to the intentions 
or acts of individuals overseas (Britain National Intelligence Machinery). The important 
differences between the two agencies developed because of their unique histories. The 
Security Service and Secret Intelligence Service were both founded in 191Q--MI-6 to 
gather foreign intelligence and MI-5 to look for German spies--and their distinct roles 
were well defined from the outset. In the U.S., competition and turfwars were more 
prevalent. The FBI had been conducting intelligence operations in Latin America during 
the 1930s while the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the precursor to the CIA did not 
form until 1942 (Fas.org).18 Consequently, more cooperation was embedded in the 
British intelligence community compared with the U.S. agencies before the two attacks 
(Parker Senate testimony 2006). 
Further, the U.S. and its citizens were born out ofa general mistrust of 
government, while the British are by and large less skeptical of their institutions. These 
cultural distinctions resurfaced strongly in the 1970s when the American public became 
18 The FBI originally wanted the military to control all overseas intelligence operations, while they handled 
all civilian intelligence matters. 
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disillusioned following the Vietnam War and the Nixon Watergate Hearings. The events 
fueled an "unsettling public realization...that America had an important, but as yet 
undefined, intelligence problem" (Jordan and Taylor, 153-155). The resulting skepticism 
directed at the intelligence agencies caused the FBI and CIA to become more secretive 
and less cooperative with each other in the years that followed. 
In contrast, the British public is known to have less "dread of government" and its 
intelligence agencies are able to conduct operations in greater anonymity. The "relatively 
benign oversight mechanisms" governing security and intelligence operations illustrate 
this notion. Oversight is either Ministerial in nature through Britain's Home Secretary, or 
bureaucratic via the National Audit Office and Joint Intelligence Committee. 
Parliamentary oversight, which is usually undertaken by Parliamentary Select 
Committees with the ability to define their agendas, has one statutory committee covering 
only issues of expenditures, administration and policy (Yoo Senate Testimony). 
u.s. Department ofJustice/Courts and U.K Home Office/Home Secretary 
The different arrangements among the intelligence and law enforcement agencies, 
judiciary, and legislative bodies also shape the different post-attack responses as well. 
\ 
One distinction between the security structures is that Britain can go further in targeting 
terrorists/9 while the U.S. courts playa larger role in influencing security legislation. 
The FISA court established in the 1970s is an example of the U.S. courts power 
(Tsoukala, Anastassia 2006,607-27). In Britain, the Prime Minister has overall 
responsibility for intelligence and security matters and is accountable to Parliament for 
19 The differing policies can be traced back to the Bill ofRights in the U.S. Constitution which forbids 
unreasonable search and seizure, and arrests with no warrant. 
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matters affecting these agencies. The Home Secretary is responsible for the Security 
Service and the Foreign Secretary is accountable for SIS and GCHQ (Britain Intelligence 
Machinery). 
As mentioned above, the role of Britain's Home Office has distinguishing 
characteristics with U.S. agencies in terms of oversight capabilities. The Home Secretary 
establishes "independent oversight bodies" for domestic intelligence in the U.K. U.S. 
oversight, on the other hand, is usually situated within the agencies they are overseeing 
(Lewis 2006,3). Additional institutional differences include the U.K. having more power 
over arresting and detaining suspected terrorists, whereas U.S. officials boast greater 
ability to use intercepted communications for court trials. 
In the United Kingdom the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act of2000 
(RlPA) is "the key UK law for domestic intelligence" (Lewis). The law delegated a great 
deal of power to the Home Secretary, and shifted additional authority away from the 
British courts and judges (Lewis). The underlying conflict between the British courts and 
the Prime Minister influences the magnitude of the counter-terror policies before and 
after the 2005 London bombings. 
An important dissimilarity between the two systems prior to the 9-11 attacks was 
the centralization of Great Britain's security agencies compared with the broader power 
relationship among U.S. counter-terror agencies. The role of the Home office is an 
example ofU.K. centralization as the organizational body controls the local police funds 
and oversees their operation concurrently. The Security Service and elected officials in 
Britain also report to the Home Secretary (within the Home Office), which means one 
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Cabinet Minster has significant control over Britain's domestic intelligence and local 
police forces (Lewis). The manner in which the two countries issue warrants highlights 
another institutional example of the U.K. centralization. In the U.K. issuing warrants is 
an Executive function while in the U.S. it is mainly a function for the courts (Feikert and 
Doyle 2006, 1). 
2. Pre-Bombing Domestic Security "Needs" 
This section compares the U.S. security needs in the years prior to the September 
11 attacks with Great Britain during the period before 9-11 through the London 
bombings. After the Cold War concluded, both the U.S. and British security agencies 
recognized the need to change their domestic security agencies to adapt to a new security 
landscape where the enemy was not well defined. Terrorism was seen as the most 
pressing security concern within the security establishment. In 1997, a major U.S. report 
issued by the National Defense Panel stated, "The greatest danger lies in unwillingness or 
an inability to change our security posture in time to meet the challenges of the next 
century" (1997). The report predicted the U.S. would require a "much larger role for 
homeland defense." The British government understood they needed to adapt, and they 
proved their need and willingness to change by consistently making counter-terror 
reforms before and after 9-11 (London Resilience Team, 2006). Yet, judging from 
statements made by leading security officials prior to the London bombings, the U.S. and 
British security agencies may have still viewed the threat in a distinctive manner. 
The perception of threat in both countries tells us about the urgency in which both 
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countries attended to their domestic security needs prior to the bombings. The more 
serious the threat is viewed within a security establishment, the more likely that country 
will make major policy changes. Therefore, reviewing the threat perception is an 
important aspect in judging the magnitude of the U.S. and U.K. pre-bombing responses 
US Pre-Bombing Security Needs 
The scholarship regarding the U.S. threat perception prior to 9-11 is varied. Some 
emphasize that the U.S. saw the need to change before 2001, but there are also examples 
showing the inability ofU.S. security agencies to adapt to the new terrorist threat.20 The 
9-11 Commission Report recounted how the U.S. emerged as the "globe's preeminent 
military power" after the Cold War, and also how the U.S. faced new threats because a 
vacuum of instability developed in the 1990's (340). However, the report also 
documented how the threat of terrorism was not atop the political agenda prior to 9-11. 
Terrorism was of such small priority in the U.S. that no polling organization even asked a 
question about it in 2000 or during the 8 months before 9-11 (341). 
On this same note Al Qaeda was not publicly referenced in intelligence 
documents until 1999. Although the 1995 National Intelligence Estimate predicted a 
future attack would occur in the United States, the report did not reveal the enemy had a 
strong organizational network in place (341). In the years from 1998 through 2001 there 
were several solid analyses regarding Al Qaeda and Bin Laden, but the Congress, 
security agencies and the media did not cause Americans to focus on the threat of 
terrorism in the United States. Prior to 9-11 there were discussions in the academic and 
20 Frederick Ritz and Brian Weiss, among others, recounted the notion that "U.S. officials were slow to 
understand the magnitude of the new threat" (2004, 9). 
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security community ofpotential "blowbacks" (Johnson 2000) and "clash of civilizations" 
(Huntington 2006), and a series of relatively ambiguous policy reports requested by 
Secretary of Defense William Cohen, but "otherwise, little attention was given before 
September 11 to establishing a scenario for anything resembling a war on terror" 
(Callahan, Dubnik, and Olshfski 2006, 555). Terrorist threats "remained stories of law 
enforcement, criminal investigations, and the prosecution ofbombers and their co­
conspirators," but there was public indifference or ignorance ofthe terrorist threat, before 
and immediately following 9-11 from most ofAmerica (2006). 
With that said, even before 2001, the United States government was aware of its 
security vulnerabilities and making steps to remedy these flaws. The U.S. Commission 
on National Security/21st Century, or the Hart-Rudman Commission as it is commonly 
known, was the report frequently referenced when the US made major policy changes 
after 9-11. The report found "mass-casualty terrorism directed against the U.S. homeland 
was of serious and growing concern" (vi) and proposed establishing a National Homeland 
Security Agency (NHSA) "with responsibility for planning, coordinating, and integrating 
various U.S. government activities involved in homeland security" (viii, 15).21 
Additionally, the Commission referenced "inadequacies" within the State Department, 
saw the intelligence community as "adjusting slowly to changed circumstances of the 
post-Cold War era" and recommended a complete overhaul of the Department ofDefense 
(x). 
A central claim among policymakers was the intelligence agencies were too slow 
21 Following the 9-11 attacks, the Hart-Rudman proposal, put forward by Representative Max Thornberry 
(TX) was reintroduced (and slightly altered) in the Committee on Governmental Affairs by Joe Lieberman. 
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to change and adapt to the terrorist threat before 9-11. For example, in January 2000, the 
CIA was monitoring the actions ofKhaiid al-Mihdhar, one of the hijackers aboard 
American Airlines Flight 77 which crashed into the Pentagon on 9-11. By January of 
2000, the CIA had obtained a photograph ofal-Mihdhar, knew his full name, had his 
passport number, and most importantly, found out he had a multiple-entry visa to the U.S. 
Former Director ofCentral intelligence, George Tenet, later acknowledged the CIA 
should have placed al-Mihdhar on the State Department's watch list which would have 
denied him entrance to the United States. Instead, the CIA did not place al-Mihdhar on 
the State Department watch list until August 23, only nineteen days before 9-11, and after 
al-Mihdhar was able to enter the U.S. and receive flying lessons. This security mishap 
occurred, because "keeping track of the whereabouts offoreign terrorists had never been 
standard practice or high priority" for the CIA before 9-11 (Zegart 2005, 79). For over 
forty years, the Cold War "dominated the thinking and operation" of the CIA and the 
other U.S. security agencies (Zegart 2005, 79). 
Before 9-11 no intelligence agencies had formal programs or "well-honed 
procedures" to assist intelligence officers or other domestic security agencies and 
coordinate information about dangerous threats before they entered the U.S. Zegart goes 
on to say, "No organization is failure-proof, and no one will ever know whether the 
World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks could have been prevented. Evidence suggests, 
however, that the U.S. intelligence community showed a stunning inability to adapt to the 
rise of terrorism after the Cold War ended" (79). 
Even as some insisted the U.S. security agencies simply didn't recognize the 
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threat before 9-11, other analysts claimed the U.S. was adapting well to the new terror 
problem overseas. Those in the latter group pointed to how resources were shifted away 
from Soviet matters after the Cold War. Former DCI, Robert Gates claimed in 1980, 58 
percent of all intelligence resources were directed towards Soviet-related matters. 
Whereas, in 1993, only 13 percent of resources were directed towards the Soviet Union 
Though the U.S. pared down their defense budgets in the 1990's, direct spending on 
counterterrorism roughly quintupled (81). 
The United States also showed signs ofre-directing their security infrastructure 
after the end of the Cold War. The FBI Director Louis Freeh added several legal attache 
offices overseas (9-11 Commission Report 76), and there were greater efforts to work 
with other countries in fleshing out terrorist groups (Zegart 2005,81). The US "signaled 
an important shift in policy" when they switched their counter-terror approach from 
targeting the terrorist, to targeting the individuals or countries who sponsored or aided 
terrorist groups. The Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 "created a 
legal category ofForeign Terrorist Organizations (PTO) and banned funding, granting of 
visas and other material support to such organizations" (Perl 2006). This act was the pre­
cursor to the USA Patriot Act of2001, which strengthened provisions.ofthe 1996 law 
(Nagel 2002, 15-16; Perl2006)?2 
In addition to poor intelligence adaptation, several common problems and 
recommendations continued to appear in the major security reports conducted in the years 
22 Another important directive under Clinton was PDD-63 which formed the National Infrastructure 
Protection Center (NIPC) in charge of "defending telecommunications, banking, transportation, and other 
critical infrastructures from electronic attack by terrorists" (Nagel 2002, 46-47). 
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leading up to 9_11.23 First, the US needed a comprehensive security strategy issued by 
the President or Congress. A second problem in the U.S. was poor oversight and 
guidance from the U.S. Congress (Zegart 2006, 101). Lastly, the lack of coordination 
among domestic security agencies was a major unresolved issue when the U.S. was 
attacked in 2001. There were 14 major intelligence agencies in the U.S. and no one was 
responsible for all of them. Before 9-11 the DCI, George Tenet, had control over only 15 
percent of intelligence budget and the Secretary ofDefense held the rest (Council on 
Foreign Relations Task Force; Zegart 100). 
DCI, George Tenet and President Clinton did make attempts to reform the U.S. 
security organization and improve coordination before 9-11. At the end of 2000, Tenet 
recognized the strategic analysis against Al-Qaeda was inadequate (9-11 Commission 
Report 342). To remedy the analysis problems, in 2001 Tenet created a strategic 
assessments branch within the Counterterrorist Center (CTC) and appointed a senior 
manager to briefhim on "creating a strategic assessment capability" (342). President 
Clinton ushered in new counter-terror and homeland security changes as well. In 1998, 
in the aftermath ofthe Kenya and Tanzania attacks, the White House created the cabinet 
position ofNational Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection and 
Counterterrorism (Shapiro 2004, 4).24 
23 Some of the major reports consisted of the Hart and Rudman Commission, a 1996 House Intelligence
 
Committee staff study, 1993 and 1995 interagency National Performance Reviews under President Clinton,
 
and the 1998 FBI Draft Strategic Plan (Zegart 2005, 86).
 
24 Prior to 9-11, the administration was already investing large amounts ofmoney on a ballistic missile
 
system as well (Shapiro).
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Yet, even with the aforementioned security moves, the overall coordination and 
resource allocation problems were not changed before 9-11. In 1995, Clinton 
implemented Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 39 which "delineates the missions 
and responsibilities of the various federal agencies involved in fighting terrorism" (Nagel 
38). The primary focus of this directive was geared towards improving management in 
the aftermath ofan attack, yet the directive did little to change the major deficiencies 
besetting the U.S. before 9-11 (Nagel 38), especially when compared to the United 
Kingdom's organization. In September 11 and the Adaptation Failure a/U.S. 
Intelligence Agencies, Amy Zegart analyzed major reports, initiatives and commissions 
pertaining to the U.S. intelligence community and counterterrorism efforts between the 
fall ofthe Soviet Union and the September 11 attacks.25 Out of 340 recommendations 
for change in the intelligence community from these reports, "only 35 were successfully 
implemented" and "79% of them resulted in no action at all" (Zegart 85-88). In 1992 and 
1996 congressional committees tried and failed to bolster powers of the DCI, but faced 
opposition from bureaucracy, congressman, and the executive (105). 
UK Pre-Bombing Security Needs 
After the 9-11 attacks the British government was forced to look at its own 
security vulnerabilities. In years prior to the London Bombings, MI-5 has had trouble 
disseminating necessary information which could have prevented "several high profile 
terrorist incidents" (Chalk and Rosenau 2004, xiv). The focus of the British government 
25 Zegart's examination reviewed, "six bipartisan blue ribbon commissions," three major unclassified 
governmental initiatives, and three think tank task forces" (Zegart 2005, 85-86). These commissions 
included the Hart and Rudman Commission, a 1996 House Intelligence Committee staff study, 1993 and 
1995 interagency National Performance Reviews under President Clinton, and the 1998 FBI Draft Strategic 
Plan (Zegart 2005, 86). 
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after September 11 was to improve and strengthen its terrorist legislation and border 
controls and curtail terrorist fmancing (Archick 2007, 14). With the hindsight of the 9­
11 attacks and the 2004 Madrid bombings, the issue of terrorism was at the forefront of 
British politics, but the perception of the threat was varied among British officials before 
the London bombings. 9-11 was indeed a wake-up call for the U.K. that spurred several 
major domestic security reforms, but the event did not cause Britain to perceive the 
terrorist threat in the same manner as the U.S. in the years after 9-11. Before 9-11 U.S. 
officials questioned whether the terrorist threat was one "they had lived with for 
decades," and similarly, before 7-7 British officials speculated whether the threat of 
terrorism was any larger than the ones they encountered during the violent years fighting 
Irish Republican Army (IRA). Blair aligned himself with Bush after 9-11 (Archick 2007, 
11), but Britain continued to become a breeding ground for militant Islamists (Kfir 2006, 
In the U.K., several important changes were implemented before the 2005 London 
bombings. The fear resulting from the 9-1 I attacks caused the British government to 
"adopt an activist legislative program," (Kfrr 2006, 3). The House of Commons Select 
Committee on Home Affairs explains the philosophy ofBritain's pre-London bombing 
approach stating, "The new terrorism legislation cannot and must not simply be a set of 
police and judicial powers. It must be part of an explicit broader anti-terrorism strategy" 
(Sixth Report ofSession 2004-2005, April 6, 2005; Kfir 2006, 3). Three major terror 
26 The U.K. likely lacked the same level ofurgency because they had not faced an international terrorist act 
since the Lockerbie bombing in 1988 (Kftr 2006, 13) 
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laws and several changes to Britain's security organization preceded the London 
Bombings in 2005. 
The Terrorism Act 2000 
This act is described by the British Home Office as the "primary piece of counter­
terrorism legislation," which includes the United Kingdom's "most vital" counter­
terrorism measures (UK Home office). The law enhanced police powers, made it illegal 
for certain groups to operate within the UK, and expanded the ability ofpolice to arrest 
subjects. The act granted police the power to arrest citizens based on a "reasonable 
suspicion" they were involved in the "preparation, instigation, or commission ofacts of 
terrorism," regardless ofwhether police think an individual has committed or is in the 
process of committing a crime (Feikert and Doyle 2006,5; Terrorism Act 200041-43). 
The British government's justification for this "pre-emptive power of arrest"27 was that 
the process ofobtaining a warrant, would, in some cases, be too late to prevent a terrorist 
act (Feikert and Doyle 2006,5). In the end, the law allowed the British government to 
have a more streamlined method of tracking terrorists before the London bombings than 
the U.S. had in 200I,28 
The Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 (ATCSA) 
The Act also gave police greater powers to investigate terror-related crimes. 
More importantly, the law sought to "promote sharing among government agencies, stop 
terrorist funding, and improve security" (Archick 2006, 39). 
27 Which happens to be similar to the Bush Administration's defense after it was revealed in 2005 they 
circumvented the FISA court by authorizing the NSA to monitor citizen phone calls without prior approval. 
28 Regulation ofInvestigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIP or RIPA) is another pertinent law which expanded 
Britain's security services' surveillance powers. 
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Civil Contingencies Act (2004) 
Another major piece of security legislation implemented before the London 
bombings was the Civil Contingencies Act. The act focused on the preparation 
component of their Four P strategy delineating the responsibilities and roles of first­
responders, and officials from local, regional and central government. The Contingencies 
Act granted the government the power to declare a state of emergency and control a crisis 
before obtaining Parliament approval. The reform represented "the first wholesale 
revision ofUK emergency legislation since the 1920s" (Perl 2007). 
The Prevention o/Terrorism Act 2005 
The Prevention ofTerrorism Act 2005 (implemented prior to the London 
bombings) reforms the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001. The Prevention of 
Terrorism Act allows for control orders to be sought for any suspected terrorist. The law 
includes including UK nationals, non-nationals and can be issued for alleged domestic 
and international terrorist activity.29 The Act reflects the British government's response 
to criticism over their neglect in targeting domestic subjects. 
Other important changes implemented prior to the London bombings included the 
establishment of a new Civil Contingencies Secretariat (CCS), the forming of the 
Security Intelligence Coordinator within Tony Blair's cabinet, and the formation of the 
Joint Intelligence Analysis Center. Before the 9-11 bombings the CCS, was created to 
respond to crises from 2000 including fuel protests, flooding, and the foot and mouth 
disease outbreak. After 9-11, the central responsibility of the CCS was to review and 
29 In every case, the Home Secretary is required to report to Parliament as soon as reasonably possible after 
a three-month period regarding the progress of the control orders (home office. Gov). 
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improve Britain's emergency response system. The Security Intelligence Coordinator 
position was created in June of2002 to coordinate issues among the intelligence services 
and set budgets and priorities. The coordinator works under the Prime Minister and the 
position is sometimes compared with the former Office ofHomeland Security in the U.S. 
(Archick 2006, 38-39). 
The Joint Intelligence Analysis Center (JTAC) was formed in June of2003 to 
improve coordination and intelligence sharing among the United Kingdom's domestic 
intelligence and law enforcement agencies. The Center hoped to "break down 
institutional barriers" among security analysts by selecting close to 100 officials from 11 
different agencies and departments. The JTAC is accountable to the director-general of 
the MIS and is equivalent to the U.S. National Counter Terrorism Center (NCTC) 
(Archick 2006,41).30 
The two final British security bodies ofnote are the Intelligence and Security 
Committee (ISC) and the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC). ISC was created out ofthe 
Intelligences Services Act (1994) and its role is to oversee the intelligence agencies. The 
Joint Intelligence Committee is made up of the agency heads and senior officials whose 
job is to provide intelligence assessments to the ministers and officials who deal with 
matters ofnational security, defense, and foreign affairs (Kfir 2006, 8). 
30 The counterterrorist function in the United Kingdom was initially held by the Police Special Branches 
(SB). 
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3. Magnitude of Pre-Bombing Changes 
While the u.s. was decidedly uncertain and slow to change in the years before 9­
11, the British government faced a completely different set ofcircumstances in the years 
before the 2005 bombings. As mentioned in the introduction, countries simply thought 
about terrorist attacks differently in the years after September 11. Because the U.S. 
attack took place four years ahead of those in London, the magnitude ofpre-bombing 
change and the threat perception were affected as a result. It was clear there were more 
major domestic changes in the United Kingdom in the years before the London bombings 
than U.S. reforms before 9-11. Most notably, after comparing the magnitude of the two 
countries' pre-bombing changes, the author concluded the impact and timing of 9-11 
could explain much of the variation. 
The fact the U.S. suffered the first large-scale coordinated attack unavoidably 
spurred change in democratized countries, and caused the U.K. to use the 9-11 attacks as 
a learning experience. The U.S. and British security agencies began collaborating and 
looking towards each other for new domestic security methods. The British government 
wasted little time in passing reforms after 9-11. For example, the ATCSA was introduced 
just two months after the September 11 attacks, and received Royal Assent before the end 
of the year. 
In comparing Great Britain's agencies in 2005 with the U.S. in 2001, we are able 
to see the major advantages Britain had over the U.S. Most notably, in July of2005 the 
U.K. already had an alert system, re-directed the primary functions of its emergency 
response head Civil Contingencies Secretariat (CCS) towards terrorist incidents, and put 
~ ~~---~~---~~~~~-----~-----------------------------
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control orders in place. Britain's intelligence agencies expenditures increased 
dramatically which allowed the Security Service to develop new regional offices. The 
establishment of the Joint Terrorism Analysis Center (JTAC) enabled Great Britain to 
improve their efficiency before the 2005 attacks. Conversely, intelligence coordination 
was one of the United States' most pressing, and unresolved security deficiencies before 
9-11. 
With this said, Britain's academic elites still questioned their countries own 
counter-terror efforts. During the 1990s, many felt Britain's security agencies were 
preoccupied with the IRA. As Britain "failed to appreciate the al-Qaida threat," the u.K. 
was allegedly turning into a 'hotbed' for Islamic militants (Kfir 2006, 13 from Gregory 
and Wilkinson 2001). In the four years between 9-11 and the 2005 London Bombings 
Britain's security changes helped their system adapt to the new terrorist threats, but there 
was still plenty of room and need for Britain's agencies to become better prepared, 
equipped, and well-organized. 
Overall, in the U.S. there was much discussion but little in the way ofmajor 
change before the September 11 attacks. The section showed the U.S. security 
establishment recognized the threat and were making efforts to change, but a "focusing 
event" in the form of the 9-11 attacks would be necessary for major change to occur. 
Zegart's study testing U.S. security gains ultimately concluded the U.S. intelligence 
officers and policymakers did "recognize the gravity of the threat posed by Al Qaida 
before September 11," while only achieving "a small degree" of the organizational 
changes they believed were necessary" (82). The creation of the National Coordinator 
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for Security, Infrastructure Protection and Counterterrorism typifies the overall pre-9-11 
security atmosphere in the U.S. Just as President Clinton recognized the gravity of the 
threat in 1998 by creating a cabinet position, the responsibilities accorded to the 
coordinator were limiting. The coordinator was given no budget, only a dozen staff, and 
no ability to direct actions by the departments or agencies (Shapiro 2004, 4).31 In turn, 
the U.S. again only achieved "a small degree" ofthe organizational changes which were 
needed before 9-11. 
4. Relevance to Post-Attack Changes 
When the post-attack changes Britain made prior to the London bombings are 
reviewed in the next section it should become clear the British government adjusted their 
domestic security structure significantly from 2001-2005. The responsive changes were a 
major reason why their government may have made fewer major reforms after the 2005 
London bombings. The formation of the JTAC supports the less need for change 
premise. Britain's ability to establish an agency similar to the type oforganization the 
U.S. needed and didn't have before 9-11, provides further evidence that Britain's 
domestic security apparatus was further advanced before the London bombings than the 
U.S. was prior to 9-11. Not surprisingly, Britain's post-attack changes revealed the U.K. 
implemented significantly fewer reforms in the specific areas ofhomeland security and 
intelligence coordination, two areas the pre-911 reforms had already addressed. With this 
said, recognizing British policymakers perceptions about the terror threat were similarly 
31 Prior to 9-11, the administration was already investing large amounts ofmoney on a ballistic missile 
system as well (Shapiro). 
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conflicted prior to the London Bombings as U.S. officials were before 9-11, reinforces 
the notion both countries could have done more before the two attacks, and in tum, the 
idea both were in need ofmajor change after the attacks. 
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CHAPTER III 
METHODOLOGY 
The section explains how I went about obtaining the data for the post-attack 
changes in both countries. As little time has passed since the London bombings, few 
scholars have been able to directly compare the major policy actions taken in Great 
Britain and the US. in the years since the attacks. Thus, a large portion ofthis thesis is 
devoted to synthesizing the changes made in both countries. The central goal of the study 
is to provide the reader with a better understanding ofwhat important security legislation 
was produced in the US. and UK. immediately following the attacks. 
The changes included in the study focused on organizational reforms which 
significantly altered the US. and UK. domestic security structures. Countries' counter­
terrorism functions and the money associated with these actions were analyzed. "Major" 
changes are the laws and reorganization efforts which met the conditions of the Mayhew 
sweeps. In the budget comparisons, major change is established if the agency showed 
more than a 10% increase from the previous spending cycle. Major changes were also 
determined by the amount ofvariance in the number ofadditions or alterations to 
domestic security policies in Great Britain and the US. following the two bombings. The 
study used changes to the organizational structure, budget totals and to determine the 
overall magnitude ofchange. Legislation and agencies, tasked with addressing issues 
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falling under the domestic security definition are the changes being compared in this 
research effort. 
The following pieces oflegislation were selected by using a research sweep 
modeled after David Mayhew's methods in his study on divided government. For my 
tests, Mayhew's two sweep process provided the amount of significant domestic security 
legislation coming out of the US. and UK. in the two years following the attacks. For 
the United States analysis I used data from September 12, 2001-September 12, 2003. 
This encompassed the 107th and the first session ofthe lOSth Congress. Testing the 
legislation after the attack helped explore what was said about the two countries, what 
differences existed, and how scholars analyzed these major legislative changes. Testing 
legislation over two years promoted response-based data, and also allowed for the 
legislation that took longer to enact. 
InDivided We Govern Mayhew selects his legislation after it meets a series of 
tests. The judgments in the first portion ofthe selection process or "Sweep One," were 
achieved by finding the legislation deemed important in the end ofthe year newspaper 
articles. These sources are useful according to Mayhew because "in reaching for absolute 
judgments, they draw comparisons across the current Congress's enactments, regardless 
ofwhat policy areas the bills were in, and across the records of current and past 
Congresses" (37). 
The purpose of Sweep One was to begin locating the most important laws enacted 
following the 9-11 and 7-7 bombings. A search from the major newspapers and political 
outlets in the U.S. and UK were used in an effort to find end ofthe year stories 
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spotlighting the major bills from the previous legislative session. On the U.S. side the 
sources included the Washington Post, New York Times, Roll Call, Congressional 
Quarterly, and the National Journal. In the United Kingdom the searches focused on five 
major publications which included the Daily Telegraph, the Guardian, the Independent, 
the New Statesman, and the Times ofLondon.. These sources were accompanied by the 
security legislation proposed in the annual "Queen's Speech." The "Queen's Speech" is 
usually given at the start ofthe Parliamentary session. The speech, crafted by the Prime 
Minister, outlines the major laws on Parliament's agenda for the upcoming year. News 
articles devoted to the Acts in the Queen's Speeches were also included in Sweep One. 
It is a useful data source since almost all ofBritain's significant laws are included in the 
speech. The National Journal ratings, newspaper analyses, and the Queen's speech 
encompass Sweep One. After finding a pertinent piece oflegislation in the articles, I 
would make sure the law was a relevant domestic security matter as defined previously. 
Ifthe law dealt with the proper issues, it was included in the analysis. 
In Sweep Two I looked for academic oriented research from authors who noted 
the functions or importance of the individual legislation (45). In addition to the popular 
political science journals, I focused on security based journals and think tank publications 
to gain data for this sweep. Mayhew explains the benefit ofthe two sweep process 
saying, "The second search compliments the first. By drawing on long-term 
perspectives ofpolicy specialists about what enactments have counted most in their areas, 
it adds a dimension of expertise" (44). The Second Sweep also requires that the 
researcher "press the sources for defensible cutpoints-that is, ones that reasonably 
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clearly dichotomize an area's enactments into more important and less important" (46). 
The Mayhew's study also "generates three categories of enactments. Some laws that 
surfaced in Sweep One now also make it onto Sweep Two lists: They are 'validated,' in 
a sense, by Sweep Two. Some laws that surfaced in Sweep One are not thus 'validated.' 
And some laws now come to notice for the first time by making it onto Sweep Two lists" 
(48). 
It is also important to note some of the differences between Sweep One and 
Sweep Two. My specific sources are different than in Mayhew's study, but my goals and 
intentions were similar. Mayhew discusses how the Sweeps are a way ofweeding out the 
important and less pertinent pieces of legislation. For instance, if a bill is found 
following searches in both sweeps, it is more likely to be of importance for the current 
project. Since Mayhew suggests that Sweep one produce less legislation than sweep two, 
for my first sweep I only included newspapers and information dealing with legislation 
that was passed into law in either the US. Congress or British Parliament. Sweep two, 
on the other hand, covered research from political science and security journals, think 
tank publications, and major government publications. I sought out information about the 
important events by exploring publicly-available committee hearings and reports from the 
US. Congress and British Parliament. The second sweep for this thesis was not limited 
to legislation passed in the U.S. and UK. The study included any major governmental 
"changes" that took place outside of the legislature as well. These included Executive 
orders, government reorganizations, and various other events which altered the political 
landscape. 
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The changes should have a direct linkage to the attacks, but any legislation written 
prior to the attacks and passed in the two years after the attacks was included in the 
analysis. Legislation passed which was not a direct response to the bombings, but was 
intended to fix an area ofdomestic security also applied. Allowing these pieces of 
legislation made it easier to catalogue my research. Yearly budget data and particular 
spending bills were also included. Because the number ofbills coming out ofCongress 
was greater than in British Parliament, using the total number of laws passed in each 
country was not seen as the most balanced data comparison. In tum, the interpretive 
analysis ofthe laws meeting the Mayhew Sweeps was a more reliable data source. The 
different legislative norms in Parliament and Congress also caused the in-depth 
interpretive tests to become more essential to the overall analysis. By spending more 
time analyzing the specific legislation coming out ofthe Mayhew-based sweeps, I hoped 
to become more accurate in the comparative discussions in the final magnitude and 
reasons for change sections. 
The status and comparative size ofthe overall changes (and basis for the section 
summary) were determined by judging the results from the post-bombing changes 
section. The central question asked was, are certain pieces oflegislation seen as causing 
more "major/groundbreaking change while others were seen as more minor? For 
instance, even ifGreat Britain produces a smaller number of significant pieces of 
legislation, if scholars viewed these laws as producing major change, than their change 
would be recognized as measuring up with United States policies. 
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CHAPTER IV
 
POST-BOMBING CHANGES (RESULTS)
 
1. Introduction 
While Britain was praised for the well-coordinated efforts oftheir first­
responders, after the bombings there was a strong beliefBritain's domestic security 
agencies needed restructuring. Tony Blair conceded many countries became complacent 
after September 11. "11 September for me was a wake up call. Do you know what I 
think the problem is? That a lot ofthe world woke up for a short time and then turned 
over and went back to sleep again" (BBC 7/26/05). On July 10,2005, three days after 
the London bombings, the New York Times published a lengthy article detailing the 
failure ofBritain's counter-terror policies leading up to the London bombings. Although 
the British government implemented several major counter-terror reforms after 9-11, 
their organizations were still seen as outdated. "The government's ability to foresee and 
respond to these increasing threats is handicapped by an archaic and compartmentalized 
system that dates from the Cold War" (Edwards 2007). As the events preceding the 7-7 
attacks became well known, the British intelligence agencies recognized they 
misinterpreted the severity ofthe threat prior to the bombings. The security agencies 
perceived the threat to be external, and believed an attack was more likely to come from 
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individuals abroad (Jones and Smith 2006). In a memo by the Joint Terrorism Analysis 
Centre (JTAC) written a month before the attack, senior intelligence officials stated: "At 
present there is not a group with the current intent and capability to attack the UK" (The 
Times, 7/19/05 from Jones and Smith). 
Given the US. and UK. domestic security agencies both faced perceptions of 
organizational failure after the two terrorist incidents, it seems logical their post-attack 
policies may be similar as well. The remaining portions of this section are devoted to 
uncovering how the U.S. and U.K. made major policy changes after the attacks to shed 
light on why there may have been unequal levels ofchange following 9-11 and 7-7. The 
section details the relevant changes meeting the Mayhew Sweeps by explaining the 
purpose ofthe legislation and changes, and why it was deemed important. The results 
(major changes) are grouped by security legislation type. The first grouping compares 
domestic intelligence and police changes, the second compares homeland security 
changes and spending totals, and the third grouping summarizes additional major 
legislation and agency reforms 
Shortly after the attacks the Bush administration and security officials believed 
Osama Bin Laden and AI Qaeda were responsible for the attacks. On September 20, 
2001 in a speech before Congress, Bush laid out the US. policy shift from deterrence to 
preemption (Perl 2007, 1). The policy ofpreemption, commonly referenced as the "Bush 
Doctrine," holds that any nation harboring terrorists would be "regarded by the US. as a 
hostile regime."32 (Sauter 2005, 42-43). The major changes in the immediate aftermath of 
9-11 covered intelligence reform, refocusing federal agencies like the FBI, instituting 
32 This became justification for the U. S. invasion of Afghanistan in October of 2001. 
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major law enforcement reforms. The major changes included the "most far-reaching 
reorganization ofthe federal government in more than 50 years" in the form of the 
Department ofHomeland Security (Sauter 2005, 51). 
Table 1lists the major post-attack changes included in the studies findings. These 
were the domestic security and counter-terror changes ofnotable importance after the 9­
11 bombings in the U.S. and the 7-7 bombings in Great Britain. This chart is not 
indicative ofall important security legislation, and does not represent comparative 
increases in departmental and security resources, budget totals. 
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Table 1. Important Post-Attack Domestic Security Reforms in the US and Great Britain 
United States (2001-2003) Great Britain (2005-2007) 
USA Patriot Act 2001 Terrorism Act 2006 
Homeland Security Act 20021 Department of 
Homeland Security 
Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism* 
Executive Order 13228 (Office ofHomeland 
Security)* 
Ministerial Committee on Security* 
HSPD-61 Terrorist Threat Integration Center 
(TTIe)* 
S015 Counter-Terrorist Command* 
National Joint Terrorism Task Force Police and Justice Act 2006 
Aviation and Transportation Security Act 200I Centre for the Protection ofNational Infrastructure 
(CPNI) 
Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform 
Act 2002 
Immigration and Asylum Act 2006 
Maritime Transportation Act 2002 Identity Cards Act 2006 
Public Health Security and Bioterrorism 
Preparedness and Response Act 2002 
HSPD-5: Management ofDomestic Incidents 
HSPD-8: National Preparedness 
HSPD 2: Combating Terrorism through 
Immigration Policies 
* Indicates changes formed through executIve action. 
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2. Law EnforcementlIntelligence Comparison 
In an effort to present the results in a straightforward manner, I've grouped the 
changes under two separate headings. The first grouping consists ofpolice and 
intelligence related changes. The second grouping focuses on the primary categories 
grouped under the U.S. definition for homeland security which include disaster, 
immigration, and border issues. It should be noted the formation of the Department of 
Homeland Security resulted in changes to U.S. police and intelligence processes,33 but 
they are divided here because intelligence agencies are often grouped separately from the 
DHS in the United States. In addition to intelligence and police related changes, the 
central DHS responsibilities were to secure America's borders, transportation, and critical 
infrastructure, improve security against bio-terrorism and weapons ofmass destruction, 
and manage the federal government's emergency response during a time of attack (Crotty 
205). Rather than neglecting the major police-related reforms to come out of the DHS 
reorganization, I attempted to include them in the homeland security section. 
33 As defined in the National Security Act of 1947, the groups part of the "intelligence community" 
consisted of: the Central Intelligence Agency; the National Security Agency; the Defense Intelligence 
Agency; the National Imagery and Mapping Agency; the National Reconnaissance Office; particular 
reconnaissance offices within the Department ofDefense; intelligence elements ofthe Army, the Navy, the 
Air Force, the Marine Corps, the Federal Bureau ofInvestigation, the Department ofthe Treasury, the 
Department ofEnergy, and the Coast Guard; the Bureau ofIntelligence and Research in the Department of 
State; and "such other elements ofany other department or agency as may be designated by the President, 
or designated jointly by the Director ofCentral Intelligence and the head of the department or agency 
concerned, as an element of the intelligence community." 50 U.S.C. § 401a(4) (2000)." 
http://www.usdoj.gov/oip/foiapost/2002foiapost38.htm 
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u.s. Law EnforcemenVlntelligence Legislation 
US. intelligence agencies received blame after 9-11. The US. Patriot Act was 
the first piece oflegislation to significantly change the manner in which US. police and 
intelligence agencies countered potential terrorist threats. 
U.S. PatriotAct 2001 
The Patriot Act was created by lawyers in the Department ofJustice less than a 
week after the September 11 attacks. On September 19, 2001 the draft was introduced in 
the House ofRepresentatives and Attorney General John Ashcroft testified in support of 
the bill before the House Committee on the Judiciary five days later (Schulhofer 2005,2­
3). After a shortened series ofhearings with no committee reports, the Patriot Act sailed 
through both houses ofCongress on October 24,2001. The bill was signed into law two 
days later. 
The Patriot Act, officially titled the "Uniting and Strengthening America by 
Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of2001," 
addressed 16 broad topics, encompassed 161 separate sections, and was over 350 pages 
in length (Schulhofer 2005,3). The important law enforcement changes to come out of 
the bill were the measures to improve coordination between the FBI, CIA and federal 
state and local law enforcement, enhanced funding for border guards, upgrades ofvisa 
databases and FBI computers, and the creation ofan agency to make the "critical 
infrastructure"34 less vulnerable (Schulhofer, 3-4). The legislation also increased law 
34 U.S. ports, chemical factories, and power plants. 
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enforcement's power to investigate terrorist suspects by expanding surveillance 
capabilities. The law provided the government greater capacity to track international 
money laundering and terrorist financing; allowed security officials access to foreign 
intelligence information received in criminal cases and expanded the definition of 
"terrorist activity"(perl 2007, 21).35 
The government's enhanced surveillance powers were one ofthe most divisive 
aspects ofthe Patriot Act,36 The act extended the use ofpen registers and trap-and-trace 
devices which recorded the origin ofphone calls and emails.37 The Patriot Act also 
allowed foreign intelligence information gathered in criminal investigations to be passed 
over to intelligence and national security officials (Perl 2006, 13-14). Section 203 ofthe 
Patriot Act amended the Federal Rules ofCriminal Procedure to allow grand jury 
information to be released to 'any Federal law enforcement, intelligence, protective, 
immigration, national defense, or national security official' in matters of' foreign 
intelligence and counterintelligence' without judicial approval (USA Patriot Act, Sec. 
203; from Ritz and Weiss, 18). 
The CIA and FBI have significantly expanded their surveillance powers as a 
result. Going against its original charter, the CIA has been given new powers to gather 
intelligence within the U.S. and Congress has given the FBI "nearly unbridled power to 
poke into the affairs ofanyone in the United States" (Crotty 2004, 124). FBI agents now 
35 The definition included material support for terrorists and/or terrorist organizations in addition to 
harboring known or suspected terrorists. 
36 Many conservatives and civil libertarians felt the government would be gaining too much power to spy 
on its own citizens, and they succeeded in requiring sunset provisions which were to expire in 2005. 
37 The US Supreme Court ruled the fourth amendment did not cover pen registers becanse "telephone 
companies often record such information for billing" (Bitz and Weiss 2004, 17). 
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work on nearly all major U.S. universities and are able to question any person accused, 
even anonymously, of making "disloyal" statements (Crotty 2004, 124). 
The most 'controversial' Patriot Act provision was an amendment to the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) (Ritz and Weiss, 18). Initially, FISA court warrants 
were distinguished from criminal warrants because FISA warrants were produced in 
secret. A crime did not have to be close to being carried out to receive a FISA warrant as 
long as there was probable cause the suspect was "an agent ofa foreign power" (Ritz and 
Weiss 19). Congress originally granted the FISA Court these powers because evidence 
gathered from court was not used for prosecuting domestic cases, but for gathering 
intelligence activities about foreign nations. The Patriot Act removed these "dual tracks" 
(criminal and foreign intelligence) by changing the requirement for a FISA wiretap from 
foreign intelligence being "the purpose" to "a significant purpose" (Ritz and Weiss 19). 
Thus, the primary intention ofFISA taps can now be for criminal prosecutions, which 
were "exactly the type of surveillance FISA was intended to exclude" (19). In a move 
intended to facilitate cooperation among agencies, the Patriot Act dismantled the 
statutory "wall" between foreign intelligence and law enforcement agencies. 
Additional Importance 
Although there is debate about whether the Patriot Act hinders civil liberties and 
suspends the Bill ofRights, all scholars agree the act provided new powerful "search and 
surveillance tools" to the Federal government (Schulhofer 2005, 1). These provisions 
were deemed important not only because they gave the intelligence agencies "sweeping 
new powers," but also because they broke down distinctions in U.S. law between foreign 
---------- ------ . -
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and domestic intelligence matters, and between law enforcement and intelligence itself 
(Shapiro 2004, 5). In the book, Rethinking the Patriot Act, the Century Foundation 
scholars said the US. government responded to the 9-11 attacks with "periodic bursts of 
dramatic action" (v). Ofthe five major actions listed, the Patriot Act was deemed the first 
"dramatic action" taken by the US. government after 9_11.38 
u.s. Non-legislative Law Enforcementllntelligence Reforms 
After 9-11 a debate formed regarding the reasons why US. law enforcement and 
intelligence agencies were unable to adequately respond to security threats leading up to 
the 9-11 attacks. The first post-9l1 domestic security reforms, like the US. Patriot Act, 
were set up to lift restrictions on the agencies. These laws are an example ofthose 
designed to tackle collection problems. The argument made by Ashcroft and others after 
9-11 was that the agencies were not able to collect the necessary information due to 
restrictive rules. The other viewpoint, espoused by New York Times columnist William 
Safire and Steven Schulhofer, was that the agencies had the information but either lacked 
the intellect, or simply failed to understand the information they had prior to the attacks. 
These were grouped as problems ofanalysis. To date, there is still not a consensus 
regarding how much either ofthese two problems influenced the 9-11 intelligence 
failures, but the concepts continue to frame many ofthe changes in the US. and UK. 
after the attacks (Ritz and Weiss). 
38 The actions included the invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan. the creation of the Department ofHomeland 
Security, the 2004 reorganization of the intelligence agencies, and the passage of the 2001 Patriot Act 
(Schulhofer, v). 
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Several changes made by the FBI and CIA illustrate the government's belief that 
the central need for U.S. agencies was to establish greater "information awareness" 
(Shapiro 2004, 5). Officials believed all the information needed to stop the 9-11 attacks 
existed within the government and private sector. Therefore, the central problem was not 
the lack of information within each individual security agency. Due to lack of 
information sharing and restrictive rules, government officials felt no one agency had 
enough information or authority to identify and act on the information available to them 
(Shapiro 2004, 5). 
Terrorist Threat and Integration Center (TTIC) 
The Terrorist Threat and Integration Center (TTIC) represented a major post-911 
change and also a response to the information-sharing critics. Ordered by President 
Bush in September of2003, HSPD 6: Directive on Integration and Use ofScreening 
Information to Protect against Terrorism, established the TTTIC. The TTIC was a FBI 
and CIA venture to bring the counter-terror information from all sources into one area 
(Hitz and Weiss 30).39 
Importance 
Critics questioned the necessity of forming the TTIC when the Department of 
Homeland Security (discussed in depth in following section) shared similar 
39 On December 17, 2004, Bush signed the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 
which established the role ofDirector of National Intelligence as the central Presidential advisor on 
intelligence matters. This role, previously held by the CIA Director was tasked with the job of"overseeing 
and coordinating the foreign and domestic activities of the intelligence community" (perl, 200724-25). 
The law also created the National Counterterrorism Center,39 designed to "selVe as a central knowledge 
bank for information about known and suspected terrorists and to coordinate and monitor counterterrorism 
plans and activities of all government agencies. The Center provides daily terrorism threat information to 
the President and other policy makers" (perl, 2007 24-25i9 The precursor to NCTC was the Terrorist 
Threat Integration Center (TIIC), established in May 2003 by Executive Order. TTIC was originally 
headed by the CIA, while the new NCTC is managed by the Director ofNational Intelligence (Shapiro 5). 
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responsibilities (Hitz and Weiss 31). It is also likely the significance ofthis change went 
unnoticed because the President announced the creation of the TTIC "in an apparent 
effort to ward ofCongressional efforts" to create a separate agency for data collection 
and analysis (Haynes 2004,378). Members ofCongress, ready to put their weight behind 
a similar agency plan, were unhappy with the Administration and often disregarded the 
reorganization. 
Regardless, the formation ofthe TTIC, with approximately 300 staffers, was 
indeed a major post-9-11 change in the U.S. In congressional testimony Winston Wiley, 
chair ofthe TTIC Senior Steering Group, said the TTIC was to function as "the U.S. 
Government hub for all terrorist threat-related analytic work" (US Senate Governmental 
Affairs Committee; Hitz and Weiss). 
Intelligence failures continued to surface as committee investigations and new 
stories came to light in the years after 9-11. FBI's failures to "connect the dots"40 were 
revealed in the spring of2002, and FBI Director Robert Mueller unveiled additional 
reorganization plans shortly thereafter. In a May 2002 speech, Mueller stated the Bureau 
had to "fundamentally change the way we do our business" (Ritz and Weiss 21). He said 
the FBI needed new technologies, needed to do a better job recruiting and training its 
members, and most importantly, the Bureau needed to be better at collaborating and 
managing information. The changes included permanently shifting 518 field agents from 
criminal to counterterrorism investigations (22). Conley portrays the impact ofMueller's 
40 Prior to 9-11 several key pieces of infonnation were not coordinated throughout the FBI. A Phoenix 
based FBI agent had recommended the Bureau investigate Muslims in flight schools, and Minneapolis 
based agents requested to search Zacarias Moussaoui's computer (Ritz and Weiss, 21). 
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efforts saying "the massive shift ofpersonnel to counterterrorism efforts and the creation 
of new units within the FBI have been impressive" (2006, 321). 
National Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) 
To improve counter-terror efforts, Director Mueller formed the National Joint 
Terrorism Task Force (JTTF). The National JTTF was created to support the local 
JTTF's and to promote information sharing within the agency. The FBI reformed its out 
of date technology by creating the Trilogy Program, which was a $379 million upgrade of 
its networks and computers. Mueller also helped form the Office ofIntelligence at FBI 
headquarters, with "strategic analysis capability" to train new analysts. The new Office 
of Intelligence is arguably the most important change instituted by the FBI after 9-11 
(Ritz and Weiss 22).41 
u.K. Law Enforcementllntelligence Legislation 
Great Britain underwent a major transformation to its counter-terrorism 
preparedness after 9-11 and the 2005 London Bombings. The British government 
adapted to the new terrorist threat by passing legislation focusing on issues of 
radicalization, militarization, and the promotion ofterrorism (Kfir 2006, 13). Several 
changes implemented by the British government will have a lasting impact on their law 
enforcement powers and organizations. The first section will look at major legislation 
causing intelligence or police changes in the u.K. followed by other important changes 
41 Other changes to the intelligence agencies include the FBI opening up more offices abroad, including 
one in china in 2002, and the CIA opening up more offices domestically (Ritz and Weiss 23). 
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implemented by order ofthe Prime Minister. 
In a speech to British Parliament in August of2005, Tony Blair outlined the 
government's new plan to secure Britain from domestic terrorist attacks. The speech 
became known as his 12 point plan. Blair's speech set the stage for new anti-terrorism 
legislation prohibiting the glorification ofterrorism, revisions ofBritain's extradition 
laws, changes to strengthen their borders, and the government's intention to extend the 
pre-trial detention length of suspected terrorists (numberlO.gov). Some of these goals 
were met in the remaining two years ofBlair's tenure in power, while others were met 
with fierce resistance from the Liberal Democrat party and various political and media 
elites. 
Terrorism Act 2006 
The largest post-London bombing legislation, the Terrorism Act 2006 was also 
the most controversial. The Terrorist Act 2006 act received Royal Assent in March of 
2006. The act's crucial measures are the creation of several new terrorism offences. 
These include making it illegal to: commit acts preparatory to terrorism; encourage 
terrorism, which includes direct or indirect efforts to persuade someone to commit a 
terrorist act; disseminate terrorist publications; and the law makes it illegal to receive or 
provide terrorist training to any individual. The Terrorist Act 2006 amended several of 
Britain's previous counter-terrorism measures as well. The act created warrants for 
police to search terrorist controlled property, improved search power at British ports, and 
afforded greater flexibility to prohibit groups that "glorify terrorism" (Cornish 2007, 14). 
The most controversial amendment in the 2006 Act was the inclusion ofa 
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provision extending the amount of time police were able to detain suspects after being 
arrested from 14 to 28 days.42 On recommendations from police and the security service 
Blair aggressively lobbied members ofParliament to extend the time from 14 to 90 days 
before the Parliamentary vote. Blair ended up losing his request for the 90 day detention 
measure marking the first time his Labor government ever lost a vote in the House of 
Commons (English People's Daily). Several members ofthe Labor party had voted 
against the measure, bringing attention to Blair's declining support in the UK. By the 
end of2006, Blair had lost support from the public, members ofhis own party, and the 
courts. The unpopular invasion ofIraq was linked to Blair's limiting supply ofpolitical 
capitol. President Bush faced similar unpopularity from the American people at this 
time, but in the first two years after 9-11 his approval ratings were still high. So, while 
the 2006 Terrorism Act was one of the major post-London bombing reforms, the vote 
which revealed the weakness ofthe British Prime Minister may be even more 
noteworthy. 
Police andJustice Act 2006 
The Police and Justice Act 2006 established the National Policing Improvement 
Agency (NPIA) to deliver the 'national mission critical' priorities and oversee and assist 
the police operations when needed. The NPIA replaced Centrex, which headed police 
training and development, the Police Information Technology Organization (PITO), and a 
few ofthe Home Office responsibilities as well (UK Home Office) Overall, the act 
represented an important, but not a "sweeping" change. 
42 The act requires that a judicial authority approve the detaining of a suspect for periods longer than two 
days (Cornish 2007, 14). 
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U.K Non-Legislative Law Enforcement/Intelligence Reforms 
By the beginning of2007, there had not been a significant amount of security 
policy change, (with the exception of the 2006 Terrorist Act), implemented since the July 
2005 attacks. Just as intelligence changes followed the reports of failure in the years after 
9-11, the real changes in Britain were not instituted until official government reports were 
released documenting the British government's security shortcomings. The London 
Assembly Review Committee, published in June of2006, and the Lessons Learned 
Report, published in September of2006,43 both highlighted poor communications, 
planning, and equipment instituted by the security agencies before and after the London 
bombings. Critics were also unimpressed by the lack of major reorganization among the 
security agencies. In response to these reports, the Conservative Party spokesman for 
homeland security said, "It's a disgrace that many of the inadequacies that emerged on 
that day have still not been rectified nearly a year later. "The government must appoint a 
single cabinet-level minister for counter terrorism or homeland security to inject energy 
and drive into dealing with this serious problem" (politics.co.uk). 
By the spring of2007, Tony Blair had revealed he would be stepping down from 
his role as Prime Minister in July. With his days in office numbered, Blair, and his Home 
Secretary John Reid, responded to claims suggesting Britain's domestic security needed 
43 The 7 July Review Committee, formerly called the London Resilience Committee was set up following
 
the London attacks in September of 2005.
 
The Lessons Learned Report was one of a series of post-London bombing reports headed by Home
 
Secretary John Reid.
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an overhaul by44 by making a few key structural changes. The major structural reforms 
were announced by Tony Blair on March 29,2007 and were put in place by May 9,2007. 
The Prime Minister's two major changes were to establish a new Ministerial Committee 
on Security and Terrorism and to create an Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism. 
The Ministerial Committee on Security subsumed the Defense and Oversees Policy 
(International Terrorism) Committee and the counter-radicalization components ofthe 
Domestic Affairs Committee. The Prime Minister headed the new committee and the 
Home Secretary will usually act as Deputy Chair (Home Office Machinery 2007). 
The Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism (OSCT) 
The Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism (OSCT) was created because the 
Prime Minister wanted to strengthen the Home Secretary's role and capabilities of the 
Home Office in "facing the terrorist threat," The OSCT is based out ofthe Home Office 
and reports to the Home Secretary through the new Ministerial Committee. The OSCT 
will now be responsible for the issues relating to Britain's CONTEST counter-terror 
strategy (Home Office Machinery 2007). The government reorganized the Home Office 
by shifting the criminal justice and sentencing policy, and the National Offender 
Management Service (which includes prison related responsibilities), to the Department 
ofConstitutional Affairs, renamed the Ministry of Justice. The Home Office retained its 
responsibilities regarding crime reduction and police service matters, immigration and 
asylum issues, and identity and passports (Cornish 2007,21). 
44 Upon taking over the role of Home Secretary from Charles Clarke in May of 2006, Reid caused an 
uproar when he said the Home Office was "not fit for purpose." Reid was also hurt politically in January of 
2007 when British judges decided not jail sex offenders due to the overcrowded prisons (formerly 
administered by Reid and the Home Office) (Cusick 2007). 
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Importance 
The Home Office reorganization was the largest non-legislative change made 
after the London bombings, but the majority of the commentary reflected skepticism over 
the changes (BBC 2007). Because Blair was careful his actions were not deemed an 
overreaction, he made sure to emphasize none of the responsibilities of the other major 
Ministries were being altered. The Prime Minister's message seemed to suggest he was 
concerned these changes would be viewed as a form of admitting his critics were right to 
call for these adjustments a year earlier. The Cabinet Office document read: 
"The changes set out here are aimed at producing a step change in our approach to 
managing the terrorist threat to the UK and wimIing the battle for hearts and minds, 
needed despite UK counter-terrorist capabilities and strategy already being among the 
best in the world. These changes do not, however, change the responsibilities of the 
Foreign and Defense Secretaries, or other ministers, or the strategic and operational 
reporting lines of any of the security and intelligence agencies. The Cabinet office will 
retain its role supporting the Prime Minister on national security and counter-terrorism" 
(Home Office Machinery 2007). 
Yet, in reaffirming the public's confidence in its security agencies, Prime Minister Blair 
also casts some doubt on the magnitude of the changes themselves. As a result, some of 
the articles came out on the other side ofthe policy debate and voiced concern about a 
potentially "stripped-down" Home Office organization. In the end, Home Secretary John 
Reid "denied that this left the Home Office in a weak position. He said the job of the 
OSCT would be to 'integrate' the counterterrorist response across government" (Travis 
2007). 
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Table 2. New Roles ofthe Departments and Ministers after 2007 Home OffICe 
Reorganization 
Home Office Ministry of Justice Attorney General's 
Office 
- Office for Security 
and Counter-terrorism 
- Policing 
- Crime Reduction and 
Drugs Strategy 
- Serious and Organised 
Crime 
- RESPECT and 
Antisocial 
Behaviour 
- Border and 
Immigration Agency 
- Identity and Passport 
Service 
- Existing functions of 
the Department for 
Constitutional Affarrs 
- National Offender 
Management Service, 
including the prison and 
probation services 
- Criminal Law and 
Sentencing Policy 
- Sponsorship of 
relevant inspectorates 
and NDPBs, including 
the Prison Service, 
Parole Board, Youth 
Justice Board 
- Existing functions 
remain, including 
superintendence of the 
prosecuting authorities 
and other existing 
criminal justice 
responsibilities 
.. . . The Office for CnmInal Justice reform will be based In the MInistry of Justice, but, as a shared 
resource, work trilaterally between the Home Office, Ministry of Justice and the Attorney General's 
Office (l'aken from Machinery ofGovernment: Security and Counter-Terrorism, and the Criminal Justice 
System, UK. Cabinet Office, March 2007). 
Similar to the problems encountered in the U.S. after 9-11, coordination issues 
were a concern for security officials after the 2005 London bombings. The police 
structure in Great Britain is largely decentralized. As mentioned, each of the 43 regional 
police forces in England, Wales, and Scotland has its own Special Branch, who 
coordinates counter-terror efforts with MI-5 (Archick 2006,40).45 A key change to 
45 Additional British police who have a role in the counter-terror efforts are the British Transport Police 
(BTP) who controls the railway systems, and the Civil Nuclear Constabulary (CNC), a police force set up 
to protect nuclear installations and materials within the country. Ministerial responsibility for the BTP rests 
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British law enforcement was the creation ofa Police International Counter Terror Unit 
(PICTU) based within the Metropolitan Police and the National Counter Terrorism 
Security Office (NaCTSO), which is based within MI-5 (Walker 2005, 387). This change 
is important because PICro now serves as a bridge between the Security Service and the 
police on issues of international terrorism (Walker). 
The largest Special Branch, which is also known as SO12, has played a central 
role in protecting Britain's national security interests. Following 9-11 and the London 
bombings, the Metropolitan Police reviewed its counter-terror policies, which led to the 
Special Branch being merged with the Anti-Terrorist Branch (S013) on October 2,2006 
(Kfir 2006, 8). The new body put in place after the London bombings is called the 
Counter-Terrorism Command (SOlS) whose purpose is to combine intelligence gathering 
operations with operational and investigatory activities (Kfir). The formation ofthe 
Counter-Terrorism Command is a significant change as the agency brings together 
distinct operations to establish a specialty force. Over 1500 police officers and staff 
make up the new body (met.police.gov). 
Center for Protection ofNational Infrastructure (CPNI) 
Another change to the domestic security apparatus in Great Britain occurred on 
April 1, 2007 with the formation ofthe Centre for the Protection ofNational 
Infrastructure (CPNI). The National Security Advice Center (NSAC), formerly a part of 
the Security Service, merged with the National Infrastructure Security Co-ordination 
Centre (NISCC). The NSAC provided advice on personnel and physical security, while 
with the Department of Transport, and the CNC works under the Department ofTrade and Industry 
(Archick 2006, 40). 
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the NISCC was responsible for advice on computer network defense and information 
assurance. The CPNI now combines more general counter-terrorism policy with IT and 
physical security concerns in mind at the same time. The CPNI is accountable to the 
Security Service General and also works closely with the UK. police the police Counter 
Terrorism Security Office (NaCTSO) are co-located with CPNI) (Cornish 2007, 8). 
Just as the FBI and CIA opened new overseas offices prior to 9-11 and stepped up 
recruitment efforts after 9-11, a comparable goal to increase man-power was undertaken 
by the British Security Service (MI-5). MI-5 declared its goal was to double the total 
number of its staff In a move which some critics claimed was long overdue, MI-5 
opened 8 new regional offices outside of its London headquarters. The purpose of this 
move was for the intelligence agencies to gain a "rich picture" ofpotential terror threats, 
but many British Muslims have questioned whether they are being unfairly targeted 
(BBC 2007). 
3. Homeland Security Comparison 
Homeland security is not a term commonly used in Great Britain, but for the 
purposes of this section, the legislation and agencies implemented in the UK. after the 
London bombings which correspond to the US. homeland security mission will be used. 
The core homeland security mission is to "prevent and deter terrorist attacks and protect 
against and respond to threats and hazards to the nation" (DHS website). Issue areas 
include border safety, aviation reform, and relevant immigration bills. Those major bills 
made in response to 9-11 in the two years following the attack were ofprimary focus. 
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u.s. Homeland Security Legislation/Reforms 
9-11 provided the U.S. government with a "huge and fleeting opportunity to 
reorganize the government... in a manner that had long been understood to be necessary 
but which heretofore had been politically impossible" (Shapiro 2004, 4). The security 
system in place still was still oriented towards the Cold War. Security agencies needed to 
coordinate vital information and intelligence pertaining to homeland security and 
counter-terrorism issues. 
On October 8,2001, less than a month after 9-11, Bush made a major domestic 
security change when he signed Executive Order 13228, establishing the Office of 
Homeland Security (OHS) and the Homeland Security Council (HSC) within the 
Executive Office ofthe President (Relyea 2003,613). Bush appointed former 
Pennsylvania governor Tom Ridge as OHS Director. The primary tasks of the council 
were to harmonize counterterrorism efforts dispersed among the security agencies, while 
"acting as an honest broker" coordinating the policy coming out ofthese agencies and 
cabinet departments (Conley 2006, 317). 
Importance 
The creation ofthe DHS likely obscured the initial importance of the OHS. 
Ridge faced a tall order in his efforts to persuade agency heads, with a culture of secrecy, 
to provide him with sufficient intelligence and terror related information. In early 2002, 
as Ridge sought to merge parts of the Customs Service, Coast Guard, and Border Patrol, 
Democratic Senators Joe Lieberman (D-CT) and Robert Byrd (D-WV) came out strongly 
against Ridge's proposal. Since Ridge had no statutory authority for his post, members 
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of congress feared he was above government accountability, and the position was altered 
after the Homeland Security Act passed in late 2002 (Conley 2006, 317). 
On October 29, 2001 Bush implemented another notable reform with HSPD 1 
(Homeland Security Presidential Directive). The directive laid out the "organization and 
operation ofthe Homeland Security Council (Compilation ofPresidential Documents 
2001, 1568). The Homeland Security Council Principles Committee was composed ofthe 
Directors of the major government agencies tasked with coordinating "homeland security 
related activities" (Compilation). 
The committee met at the call ofthe Assistant to the President for Homeland 
Security, a post held by Governor Ridge in addition to his title as Chairman (Haynes 
2004, 372). Therefore, Ridge had influence in organizing the Security Council and was 
"a trusted advisor with unfettered access to President Bush"(Conley 317). Conley 
emphasized the authority ofthe OHS saying, "Bush's move was more than window 
dressing designed to show the country that he was 'doing something' to fight terrorism" 
(Conley). 
Although security experts and public officials disagreed how to structure a new 
homeland security agency, by the summer of2002 there was a consensus among 
policymakers the U.S. needed to reorganize its domestic security operations. U.S. 
homeland security affairs were extremely disjointed prior to the formation ofthe DHS46 
(Shapiro 2004, 4). Yet, the 9-11 attacks "stimulated the requisite political will" to 
46 For instance, border security issues were split among several departments including: the Immigration and 
Naturalizations Service of the Justice Department, the Customs Service of the Treasmy Department, the 
Consular Service in the State Department, and the Coast Guard within the Transportation Department, the 
Defense Department, Department of Agriculture, and the Border Patrol, and possibly a few others as well 
(Shapiro 2004, 4). 
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successfully implement the reforms recommended by several commissions which had 
been unable to "garner consensus in the absence of crisis" (Conley 2006, 305). The 
Homeland Security Act of2002 and subsequent formation ofthe Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) were the most noticeable and sizeable reforms during the two 
years after September 11. 
The Homeland Security Act 2002 and Creation ofDepartment ofHomeland Security 
Before the Homeland Security Act, no one Federal Government agency had 
homeland security as its "primary mission." The legislation signed into law on 
November 2, 2007 created a new department ofhomeland security by "substantially 
transforming the current confusing patchwork ofgovernment activities into a single 
department" whose central mission was to secure the U.S. homeland (Crotty 2004,205). 
The department's mission was to prevent terrorist attacks within the U.S., reduce 
vulnerability to terrorism, minimize damage and recover from any attacks that may occur 
(Crotty). 47 
The U. S. Congress determined the appropriate administrative structure for the 
new "mega-agency" which was to comprise over 170,000 employees and affect, in one 
form or another, every agency of the federal government (Crotty 205; Relyea 2006, 7). 
The most important agencies shifted under the Department ofHomeland Security 
included the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the Coast Guard, Secret 
47 The central DRS responsibilities included securing America's borders, transportation, and critical 
infrastructure, analyzing domestic security intelligence, coordinating homeland security activities with 
local and state governments, improving security against bio-terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, 
and managing the federal government's emergency response during the time of an attack (Crotty 205). 
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Service, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and Customs and Border Protection. 
The other agencies made up the National Cyber Security Division and the Transportation 
Security Agency (Conley 2006, 318). The legislation also formally established the HSC 
which was initially put into action from Bush's Executive Order 13228 (Sauter 2005, 
213). 
The Homeland Security Act created four new directorates responsible for 
different aspects ofprotecting the U.S. homeland. The four directorates are the border 
and Transportation Security, Emergency Preparedness and Response, Science and 
Technology, and Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection. The Border and 
Transpiration Directorate are accountable for maintaining secure borders and protecting 
the transportation systems from terrorist entering the country or harboring weapons. The 
TSA and the Customs and Border Protection agency (CBP), which enforces interior 
immigration matters and customs law enforcement, are also under this directorate. 
Lastly, the HSA delineated the DHS with responsibility for establishing visa policies and 
related security measures. The BTS became responsible for overseeing the visa issuance 
and monitoring process (Sauter 2005,217-218). 
The Emergency Preparedness and Response (EPR) Directorate within the DHS 
handles federal "preparedness, response, and mitigation efforts for both natural and 
technological disasters," which include terrorist attacks (Sauter 2005,217-218). The 
EPR coordinates the National Response Plan and federal and state agencies during an 
actual attack. The central component ofthe EPR is the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency (FEMA). The Science and Technology Directorate is the main research arm of 
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the DHS, while the Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate (IAIP) 
allows the department to review intelligence information and provide timely warnings to 
the U.S. public. The IAIP's three central components are the Office ofInformation 
Analysis (IA), the Office ofInfrastructure Protection (IP), and the Homeland Security 
Operations Center (HSOC). The HSOC also maintains the tools to collaborate and share 
"sensitive" but "unclassified" intelligence information with the states and major urban 
areas in the U. S. An important distinction between the IAIP and the FBI is that the IAIP 
does not have field agencies or assets to collect intelligence. Rather, the main priority of 
the IAIP is to analyze the information collected from the departments within DHS, state 
and local agencies, and the private sector to deliver warnings when necessary (Sauter 
2005,219-223).48 
The Coast Guard and Secret Service are independent agencies within the DHS 
with "significant responsibility." The Coast Guard is the lead maritime security agency 
who protects the maritime transportation system and commerce entering the U.S. The 
Coast Guard has unique legal status as it is considered a uniformed member of the 
military services, while also receiving status as an intelligence, law enforcement and 
regulatory agency (Sauter 223-224). 
Importance 
The Homeland Security Act (HSA), signed into law by President Bush on 
November 25, 2002, is significant for a number of reasons. First, the law represents the 
"administrative response to the emergence of a new government function," via the 
48 The analysis and dissemination ofwarnings are primarily performed by the Infrastmcture Protection and 
Analysis offices within the IAIP (Sauter 219,2005). 
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expanded threat ofterrorism (Moynihan 2005, 171). The change was important to the 
legislative branch as well as the executive because as Donald Kettl said, "many members 
ofCongress saw this as one of the biggest new initiatives in decades, and they wanted to 
ensure that they could control its direction" (Perrow 2006, 8). 
HSA reworked the inter-departmental relations of agencies through the shift 
which will have lasting impact for years down the road. FEMA, for example, was 
transferred into the DHS, but lost is prestige and much ofthe influence it had prior to 9­
11 (Tierney 2005, 3). As the Office for Domestic Preparedness (ODP) was transferred 
into the DHS from the Department of Justice, it took control over many important DHS 
programs like the Homeland Security Grant Program and Urban Areas Security Initiative, 
thereby reducing the influence ofFEMA organizationally. The impact ofthese changes 
continue as the agencies involved in the DHS shift continue to take on new 
responsibilities and establish their place in the U.S. bureaucratic structure 
The HSA and formation ofDHS is also "significant" in terms ofcomparative 
public management policy (Moynihan 2005, 171). Donald Moynihan describes the HSA 
as "perhaps the most dramatic shift in the direction of management flexibility seen since 
the founding ofthe civil service system in the U.S" (2005, 171). Many other prominent 
domestic security scholars claim it could be "the prototype for the rest ofgovernment in 
the coming years" (Moynihan). 
Lastly, the law's formation ofDHS is important for the "sheer size" ofthe new 
organization which would now become the third largest department and fourth largest in 
budgetary appropriations (Moynihan 2005, 171; Crotty 2004, 206). Conley notes how 
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prior U.S. presidents were either uninterested in expending political capitol to reorganize 
the government bureaucracy or simply failed in their efforts to do so (Conley 2006, 315). 
So, while the merging of22 federal agencies was "one ofthe most visible aftereffects of 
9-11" (Conley 315), it was also the last major reorganization ofthe federal government 
since 1947, when President Truman and the National Security Act formed the CIA and 
NSC, and unified the armed forces via the Defense Department (Conley). 
Additional u.s. Homeland Security Laws 
Although not on the same level ofchange as the HSA, the following section 
reviews several ofthe more important post-911 homeland security related domestic laws. 
Aviation and Transportation Security Act 
The Aviation and Transportation Security Act, made public law on November 19, 
2001, amended the Federal Transportation Act to form the Transportation Security 
Administration (TSA) within the Department ofTransportation (DOT). The TSA is 
headed by the undersecretary oftransportation who is responsible for the security of all 
methods oftransportation under DOT jurisdiction. TSA is in charge ofcivil aviation 
security; domestic transportation during national emergencies (these include aviation, 
rail, maritime, and port security); managing any security information such as identifying 
at-risk individuals; and TSA reasonability for federal screening ofpassenger air travel 
(CRS summary, Thomas.gov). 
Prior to 9-11, state and local airport owners and private carriers were tasked with 
securing their own airports (Haynes 2004 375). After Congress quickly ushered through 
the bill, there was substantial jurisdictional confusion among FDA staff, private carriers, 
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and the local airlines (Haynes). Eventually the TSA was moved into the newly formed 
Department ofHomeland Security. 
Although the effectiveness ofairline screeners and the hastily implemented 
legislation has caused observers to initially paint the TSA in a fairly negative light, 
"knowledgeable observers" noted the bill was a "significant change in the USDOT 
organizational structure" (Haynes). Again, this thesis is primarily concerned with the 
magnitude of the changes, not with the eventual effectiveness of the legislation or 
reorganization once it is implemented. The case of the Aviation and Transportation 
Security Act illustrates another quick and major domestic security reform by the U.S. 
government after 9-11. 
EnhancedBorder Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of2002 
With domestic security staying atop the political agenda in the 10ih Congress, 
securing the nations borders became a top priority. The Enhanced Border Security and 
Visa Entry Reform Act, enforced agencies to share information in an effort to determine 
whether individuals were seeking visas, were inadmissible or deportable. The State 
Department, INS, and federal law enforcement agencies were held accountable for these 
new requirements (McDaniel 2007, 15; Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry 
Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 107-173 (2002). The State Department changes included the 
elimination of the crew list visa. The new change required all crew members entering the 
U.S. to have a visa, passport, and undergo a background check and interview. Although 
the larger post 9-11 change came via the HSA which incorporated the INSlBorder Patrol, 
Customs, and related agencies into the new Department ofHomeland Security, the border 
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security act consisted of several fundamental changes to the overall domestic security 
process (Kapp and Lum 2003, 33-34). 
Public Health Security andBioterrorism Preparedness andResponse Act of2002 
The Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Act was passed to "improve the 
ability ofthe United States to prevent, prepare for, and respond to bioterrorism and other 
public health emergencies" (Public Law 107-188, 116 STAT. 594,6/12/02). The act 
required any businesses or individuals using any of the 42 biological agents listed by the 
Secretary ofHealth and Human Services as posing a severe public health and safety 
threat to register with the Secretary. Individuals or businesses using the threatening 
agents were subject to security requirements, such as personnel screening and 
inspections. The Act also authorized the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to enact 
rules for careful screening of imported food supplies (McDaniel 18-19). 
Maritime Transportation Act 2002 
Before the 9-11 attacks, when addressing maritime issues, the federal government 
focused on safety and navigational issues, such as environmental protection, but rarely on 
security related matters. Once the September 11 attacks caused policymakers to reform 
airline security, attention was directed to overhauling America's ports. The Maritime 
Transportation Act, passed in November of2002, created a broad range ofprograms to 
secure U.S. ports and waterways. The legislation assessed the security preparedness of 
U. S. ports by identifying tracking vessels and limiting access to sensitive areas. 
(Wrightson 2003) The programs included creating Maritime Safety and Security Teams 
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within the U.S. Coast Guard,49 the TSA creating new identity cards to secure 
transportation facilities, and other projects undertaken by the Bureau ofCustoms and 
Border Protection (BCBP) and the Maritime Administration (MARAD) (Wrightson).50 
Importance 
The MTSA imposed an "ambitious schedule of requirements" for several federal 
agencies. In addition, MTSA mandated a comprehensive security framework which 
included planning, personnel security, and careful monitoring ofvessels and cargo. A 
2003 GAO study said, "MTSA was a landmark legislation that mandated a quantum leap 
in security preparedness for America's maritime ports." Director ofHomeland Security 
and Justice, Mary Wrigthson noted the potential changes saying, "This sweeping piece 
of legislation was enacted just 10 months ago, but it has already produced major changes 
in the nation's approach to maritime security" (GAO Testimony) 
As evidenced by the OHS and Home Office reorganization, executive actions can 
create extensive security reforms. "Indeed, many significant actions taken by President 
Bush in the aftermath of9/11 that had broad implications for homeland security were 
initiated directly by the White House" (Conley 2006, 309). The following actions are 
included in the results section because they are of notable importance to the domestic 
security community. However, the remaining actions and polices were not intended to 
49 The teams can be deployed quickly and are designed to provide protection against terrorism for "high­
interest vessels" and critical infrastructure. 
50 Most of the agencies with MTSA responsibilities were reorganized into the Department ofHomeland 
Security in March 2003, just 5 months after the enactment of MTSA. The "vast recombination of 
organizational cultures" established new chain ofcommands and duties across several government agencies 
(Wrightson 2003). 
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initiate a sweeping level ofchange like we saw in previous legislation. 
HSPD 5: Management ofDomestic Incidents and HSPD: 8 National Preparedness 
President Bush issued two homeland security presidential directives (HSPDs) that 
"transformed" the U.S. crisis management policy system. HSPD-5 Management of 
Domestic Incidents, and HSPD-8 National Preparedness, is "the two directives that are 
most relevant for event management" (Tierney 2005,4). HSPD-5 created a 
comprehensive national incident management system ("Directive on Management of 
Domestic Incidents," 2/8/03, 280). HSPD-5 also sought to develop a "comprehensive 
approach" to domestic management which unifies the framework at the state, local, and 
federal levels ofgovernment (Tierney). 
HSPD-5 conferred the Secretary ofHomeland security with responsibility for 
developing a National Response Plan (NRP) and a National Incident Management 
System (NIMS). The directive required all federal agencies to adopt NIMS. HSPD-5 
was a requirement for any other government entities receiving federal assistance as well 
(Tierney 2005,4). In turn, these mandatory requirements significantly altered the 
management process at every level ofgovernment in the U.S. 
HSPD-8, National Preparedness, provided the Secretary ofHomeland Security 
authority in setting the national preparedness goal. The Secretary was also tasked with 
improving U.S. programs response and prevention capabilities. Preparing for terrorist 
events is the primary focus ofHSPD-8, which includes proving better equipment for 
emergency response groups (Tierney 2005,4). 
Additional Importance 
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Although the two directives did not replace the pre-existing Federal Response 
Plan developed in the late 1980s, the NRP did "make several important modifications" 
(Tierney 2005, 4). The National Response Plan now allocated primary crisis 
management responsibility to the Secretary ofHomeland Security. The language also 
strongly suggested the federal government would receive greater ability to directly 
manage future crises. Thus, the language in the directives modified previous policies 
which granted disaster management to local authorities. Finally, the most profound 
change was the institutionalization ofthe Incident Command System (rCS) as the desired 
organizational structure for disaster management at all levels ofgovernment (Tierney). 
HSPD 2: Combating Terrorism through Immigration Policies 
The second HSPD issued by President Bush put several post-911 security changes 
into action. The directive created the Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force to ensure 
Federal agencies coordinate programs to deny aliens suspected ofbeing engaged in 
terrorist activity entry into the U. S. The directive also called for these task forces to 
"locate, detain, prosecute, or deport any such aliens already present in the United States" 
(HSPD-2 from whitehouse.gov). 
A second change was the enhanced capability ofthe INS and Customs 
Enforcement agencies. The Attorney General and Director ofCentral Intelligence were 
assigned to improve the investigative and intelligence analysis capabilities ofthe 
Customs Service and INS (HSPD-2). The plan calls for a significant increase in the 
number ofCustoms and INS agents assigned to Joint Terrorism Task Forces. 
The last major change, and perhaps most controversial, were Bush's directives 
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targeting international students. The initiative prohibits certain international students 
from gaining education "in sensitive areas." The government program was to use a 
student's "sensitive courses of study" as justification for denial oftheir visa application. 
The initiative provides the government ability to track a foreign student's class schedule, 
academic major, and the source of the student's education funding. The initiative also 
tasked the INS, with Department ofEducation's consultation, to conduct "period reviews 
ofall institutions" receiving nonimmigrant and foreign exchange students. If an 
institution failed to comply with these reviews, they could potentially lose their ability to 
receive foreign exchange students in the future (HSPD-2). 
UK Homeland Security Legislation 
Immigration/Asylum Act 2006 
The immigration and Asylum Act, received Royal Assent on March 30, and 
caused several changes to Britain's immigration and domestic security processes. The 
act removed the appeal process for individuals who had been denied entrance into the 
UK. The 2006 Act gave immigration officials the ability to request fingerprints. The 
law also enables immigration officers to require airline or ship crews to furnish passenger 
lists or related information (Explanatory Notes, Immigration Asylum Act 2006). The 
implemented ofthe Immigration/Asylum Act can be attributed to the criticism the British 
government received regarding their failure to strengthen their immigration procedures. 
Identity Cards Act 2006 
The Identity Cards Act received royal assent, becoming British law, on March 30 
2006. The identity cards will be provided to citizens and foreign nationals over 16 years 
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in age who have been UK residents for at least 3 months time. To give the British 
government a "stronger way ofprotecting people's identities," biometric identifiers will 
be used to match owners with their cards. Background checks will be conducted to 
ensure the identities for each resident's card is valid. The first foreign national residence 
permits will be introduced in 2008, and the first ill cards for British citizens in 2009 (UK 
Home office Website). 
The Identity Cards Act is not a major structural change, but it should have a 
profound impact on the activities and procedures of law enforcement and border security 
agencies throughout Great Britain. 
Additional u.K. Homeland Security Changes 
The formation of the New Dimension program of investment in fire and rescue 
services to give them better tools to respond to major terrorist attacks or disasters. The 
Firelink project was formed in March of2006 to provide a Nation-wide radio system for 
the Fire and Rescue Service along with other 'blue light' emergency services (Cornish 
2007,20). 
The Home Office Immigration and Nationality Directorate (IND) were reformed 
following a 2006 review. The IND was changed to become a "more powerful agency" 
with greater operational freedoms. The new executive agency which formed in April of 
2007 is called the Border and Immigration Agency (BIA). (Cornish 28). 
After the 1988 bombing ofPan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland the UK 
further established its security legislation aimed towards preventing terrorist attacks on its 
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air, maritime, and rail transportation systems (Archick 2006,44). The Anti-terrorism, 
Crime and Security Act 2001 strengthen the airlines, and since 9-11 the UK has improved 
the border and security measures with greater "stop-and search" powers for police, 
immigration, and customs officials. Additional equipment checking for illicit and 
radioactive materials has been introduced at British ports in recent years. Many UK ports 
also take part in the U.S. Container Security Initiative, which allows U.S. customs 
officers to pre-screen cargo bound for the U.S. before it reaches American shores. In the 
wake ofthe 2005 London bombings, Britain's Department ofTransportation announced 
plans to conduct trial screenings ofpassengers and baggage at certain rail and London 
Underground stations in 2006. (Archick 2006,45; Department of Transport Website) 
The British government insists it is involved in a "program ofhardening a number 
ofcritical infrastructure sites," but public information is limited due to security concerns. 
The UK continues to carry out exercises to give the government and emergency teams a 
chance to practice their disaster response initiatives. As mentioned earlier, the major UK 
homeland security changes came prior to the London bombings. These include the 
establishment of the Civil Contingencies Secretariat in 2002, and passage the Civil 
Contingencies Act in 2004. The 2004 Civil Contingencies Act represented the "first 
wholesale revision ofUK emergency legislation since the 1920s" (Archick 2006,46-47). 
Britain has made progress with their homeland security functions since 2005, but 
analysts have questioned whether their funding is sufficient (Archick). 
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4. US and UK Spending Comparisons 
UKSpending 
Following the London bombings, the British government allocated additional 
resources towards domestic counter-terrorism efforts. U.K. law enforcement and 
terrorist~based intelligence work were a key component of the ofthe prevention and 
pursuit aspects of its "Four P" policy. British security forces uncovered several terrorist 
groups and potential terrorist plots.51 The government has also invested more money 
into the intelligence and police forces, as they expanded their counter-terror 
investigations. With the additional resources, MI-5 started recruiting new intelligence 
officers with the goal of increasing its staffby 50% to 3,000 by the year 2008 (Archick 
2006,43). 
For every official praising Britain's police and intelligence agencies' 
achievements, there are others questioning whether the British government is devoting 
enough resources to improve their domestic security bodies. An official government 
report reviewing the 7-7 bombings published in May of2006 blamed "a lack of resources 
for the security services' failure" to prevent the London attack (Guardian 2006). Another 
study by the St Andrews/Southampton ESRC found the GCHQ, has had difficulty 
balancing their new counterterror focus. This has caused the agency to decrease their 
collection efforts in "many non-priority geographical areas and even on some aspects of 
51 Notable examples include catching an Al-Qaeda-affiliate cell accused ofmaking chemical weapons 
(Archick 2006,43), and the discovery of the coordinated plot to blow up airplanes headed from London to 
the U.S. 
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counterproliferation" (Archick 2006,44). Thus, there is debate about the magnitude of 
Britain's recent domestic security spending. 
According to the Congressional Research Service, British spending on "public 
order and security" grew from approximately $40 billion in 2001 to $53 billion in 2005 
(Archick 2006,42). Public order and security includes "police services, fIre protection 
services, law courts, prisons, and research and development" (Archick).52 The recently 
published Spending Review of2007 showed expenditures for the "police, criminal justice 
system and wider public order and safety" has risen over 50% since 1997-1998 (2007 
Pre-Budget Report and Comprehensive Spending Review, 32). Judged over a ten-year 
period, this comes out to a 5% increase annually, which does not meet the requirements 
for major change. 
The money allocated for counter-terrorism, intelligence and resilience increased 
in the aftermath ofthe 2005 London bombings. The 2004 Spending Review showed the 
total spending on counterterrorism and resilience across all departments consistently went 
up from $1.8 billion the year prior to 9-11 to $2.6 billion in 2004-2005. This fIgure is 
expected to exceed $3.6 billion by 2007-2008 (Archick). The recently released 2007 
Spending Review, revealed total spending on counter-terrorism and intelligence was 
rising from £2.5 in 2007-2008 to £3.5 billion in 2010-11 (Spending Review 2007,4). 
Therefore, the percentage budget allocation stayed constant with a 28% increase from 
2005-2008 and a predicted increase of29% between 2008-2011. This brings Britain's 
52 Departmental budget priorities and spending limits in the UK. are prepared by the Prime Minister, 
cabinet ministers, and the Chancellor of the Exchequer. Because the Prime Minister and his cabinet are 
selected from the majority party in the House of Commons, the budget does not face resistance in the UK. 
like it often does in the US. (Archick 2006,41). 
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annual rise in counter-terrorism and intelligence spending to approximately 9.5%, 
essentially meet the standards for major change. 
In the UK there was a 2.25 % annual real increase in the Department for 
Transport's budget, and a 1.1% a year increase for the Home Office. Since 9-11, the 
Home Office reports its funding towards homeland security related programs has 
increased by providing an additional 85.5 million to counter bio-terrorism, 56 million to 
the Fire Service for decontamination programs, and 132 million to the Fire Service for 
search and rescue equipment (UK Home Office). 
The 2007 Spending Review figures show the Home Office is to receive an 
additional £220 million a year by 2010-11. The funds will be used for Home Office 
resources "as part ofthe cross-government CSR07 settlement for counterterrorism." The 
new totals increases the Home Office budget from £9.2 billion in 2007-08 to £10.3 billion 
in 2010-11 (Spending Review 2007,225). 
US Spending 
Since 9-11, tracking counter-terrorism spending has become increasingly more 
complex. It was difficult to separate areas ofdefense, intelligence, homeland security, 
and law enforcement. Previously, defense was the domain ofthe military, intelligence, 
and diplomatic agencies. Now, "congressional anti-terrorism funding goes to more than 
forty-six federal bureaus and offices in twenty agencies" (24). This section reviews 
spending for intelligence and police, and due to different spending classifications in the 
U.S. and u.K., this section will also compare totals related to homeland defense (US) and 
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counter-terror (UK). 
From September 11, 20001 up through the beginning of2004 (FY2001-FY2004), 
U.S. government funding for combating terrorism, defense, military operations, 
homeland security and related activities, has increased by over $407 billion.53 
Approximately $167 billion ofthe $407 billion was directly related to the 9-11 attacks 
and to improving US. security functions for a future attack (Kosiak 2004, 1). $83 billion 
ofthis total was allocated to the Department ofDefense ($63 billion through 
supplemental appropriations acts and $20 billion from annual defense acts). Part ofthe 
$63 billion went to homeland defense in the US., while the rest was spent on military 
operations in Mghanistan. 
In the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments grouping by "major 
mission or activity," a total of$65 million went to non-DOD Homeland Security and 
combating terrorism issues. Ifwe look at the funding totals provided in appropriations 
acts for combating terrorism that include homeland security, US. spending increased by 
28% percent from FY2001 to FY2002 ($21-$29 billion) and 40% from FY2002-FY2003 
($29-$49 billion). Supplemental funding for "defense, combating terrorism, homeland 
security, and related activities," increased by 55% from 2001-2002 (20-44 billion), and 
by 50% in 2002-2003 (44-88 billion) (Kosiak 2004,4-6). 
According to Congressional Budget Office statistics, appropriations for 
53 This figure only accounts for discretionary budget authority from the annual or supplemental 
appropriations bills approved by Congress during this time. "This figure represents the level of funding 
appropriated for these programs and activities over the fiscal year (FY) 2001-04 period that is above what 
would have been projected to have been provided in these areas, over these years, hadfunding simply been 
increased at the rate ofinflation. In real (inflation-adjusted) terms, funding for these programs and 
activities is about 41 percent higher in FY 2004 than it was just prior to the attacks of 9-11.3" (Kosiak) 
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combating terrorism and protecting critical infrastructure rose from approximately $7.2 
billion in 1998 to $13.5 billion in President Bush's pre-911 funding request (CBO and 
147 Protecting the homeland). Out of this total, defense and intelligence agencies, and the 
Justice Department funding accounted for $5.5 billion in 1998. This total increased to 
$8.2 billion pre-911 of2002 (taken from CBO and protecting the homeland 148-49). 
After 9-11 the total 2002 budget authority increased was $22.2 billion, a 68% increase 
from 2001. 
Homeland Security spending in the United States increased tremendously after 9­
11. During FYOI homeland security (non DOD) spending were $10 billion; increasing to 
$13 billion in FY 2002, and 24 billion in FY 2003. The discretionary spending increased 
by 21% between FY 2001 and FY 2002 and then by 85% between FY2002 and FY2003. 
We see the dramatic increase between FY 2002 and FY 2003 because the FY 2001 
budget was published prior to the 9-11 attacks, and because the DHS was formed in 2003 
(OMB budget totals FY 2006). Funding for the Department ofHomeland Security rose 
at an average rate of 16% between 2001-2006, the largest of any U.S. government 
department (OMB FY2006 budget). The Department of Transportation saw a 6% 
average funding decrease of 6% during 2001-2006, while the Department ofDefense 
increased by 6.7% (White House 2006). 
Scholars offer mixed reactions towards the United States' post 9-11 homeland 
security spending. The new Executive offices and government agencies solely dedicated 
for homeland security affairs was a new concept in 2001. Therefore, it was not surprising 
to see dramatic funding increases follow the opening of these new large-scale agencies. 
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Most commentators were in agreement in describing the large new DHS budget. Yet, as 
the Bush Administration kept security atop the political agenda after the Republicans 
seized full control ofCongress in 2002, and continued to allocate more money for foreign 
security affairs, several Democrats began commenting on the limited spending devoted 
to homeland security efforts. In 2003, Senator Joe Lieberman requested the 
administration add an additional $16 billion in homeland security spending above the 
administration's budget request (Haynes). These criticisms have intensified over the 
years, thus obscuring the fact that U.S. homeland security based spending has increased 
at a higher rate than all US. departments since 9-11 (FY 2006 budget report). 
The agencies and elements within the fiscal comparisons are not exact. Using 
these totals, however, it is clear the U.S. increased at a much higher rate than the UK. 
The homeland security budget categories were less well defined in Great Britain which is 
why I used the Home Office and its relevant agencies as the basis for the comparison 
with DHS. Originally, I intended to compare the particular appropriations bills as the 
basis for the spending comparisons, but it was difficult to form consistent breakdowns 
between homeland security, intelligence, and law enforcement funding. By using the 
figures tabulated from the OMB and British's HM Treasury, I was able to use similar 
resources which also provided a slightly more reliable breakdown oftotal spending in 
each country. 
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CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
Descriptions of the importance and magnitude ofvarious reforms were 
documented in the prior sections. The brief summary section is provided to compare the 
U.K. and U.S. changes more generally. The author discusses the themes he saw after 
comparing the results sections. It should be noted that not all notable legislation was 
included in support of the author's comparative analysis. 
After comparing the results of the study I found that overall the U.S. experienced 
a much greater level ofchange than in the U.K. For the purposes of the original research 
question, the assumptions about the magnitude of the U.S. change generally held true. 
There were fewer pieces oflegislation passed in the U.K. after the London bombings. In 
the interpretive analysis there were more scholars who detailed the significance ofU.S. 
laws than the U.K.laws. There was greater agreement in the daily newspaper accounts 
about the large U.S. post 9-11 response when compared with articles devoted to post 7-7 
reforms. In total, there were more significant U.S. changes, but with the reorganization 
of the Home Office, the British government began to narrow the gap. 
Although the thesis did not focus on the amount of legislation passed in both 
countries, Claire Rubin created a useful tally and timeline of the major post-911 
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changes.54 In the 18 months after 9-11, Rubin found: 20 major pieces of legislation were 
enacted, 12 major organizational changes implemented, 12 Executive Directives issued, 
and 6 "major mandates for state and local government" were initiated as a result ofthese 
actions (Rubin 2004, 2). In probably the most impressive statistic explaining the 
magnitude of the post 9-11 changes, Rubin revealed the "amount of legislative and policy 
changes" occurring in the 18 months after 9-11 "was greater than the previous 18 years" 
(2004,2). 
1. Categorizing by Type of Security Change 
Although the results reflected prior assumptions about a large post-bombing U.S. 
response, a fuller picture develops when the changes are compared by security type. The 
prior sections show how each different aspect of domestic security has its own set of 
unique problems. 
The study could not claim the U.S. domestic security changes far surpassed the 
U.K. changes in every area during the two years after the bombings. Great Britain's 
changes came close to the level of the U.S. changes in some aspects ofdomestic security. 
When comparing the intelligence and police based changes, Britain's changes were close 
to the level ofchange seen in the U.S. The 2006 Terrorist Act provided the police with 
more power. The merging of the Special Branch with the Anti-Terrorism Branch (SOB) 
to form the Counter-Terrorism Command (SO15) looks to greatly improved UK police 
and intelligence operations and coordination. 
54 Rubin's timeline can be found at http://www.disaster-timeline.com/TTL2007A-Apr15-secure.pdf 
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On the U.S. side, the Patriot Act was widely seen as the law with the potential to 
have the most long lasting change, and it expanded intelligence agencies powers in the 
process. The U.S. also formed several new bodies to improve intelligence gathering and 
departmental coordination. The formation of the TTIC and the National Joint Terrorism 
Task Force within the FBI provided extensive reorganization for the U.S. intelligence 
agencies. With this said, several security analysts, do not agree with the notion the FBI 
made significant reforms after 9-11. 
When comparing homeland security changes, or efforts focused on prevention 
and response, the U.S. changes were much greater than the post London bombing 
changes. Although scholars have criticized the way the DHS was formed and the amount 
ofmoney being spent on the agency, few referenced the DHS without noting the 
enormity of the changes, which would encompass the new bureaucracy. The DHS 
formation affected every federal agency in some form or another; the changes helped 
define "homeland security" in the U.S., and spawned growth of a new major component 
to the U.S. security system. 
The recent reorganization within the U.K. Home Office should promote large­
scale changes for Britain's domestic security efforts. Commentators have predicted the 
formation of the OSCT will generate an increased focus on Britain's domestic counter­
terrorism efforts as well. At the same time, critics noted how the changes were only the 
beginning of a series ofreforms to be enacted under new Prime Minister Gordon Brown. 
Overall, the British homeland security changes seemed to be minor corrective fixes 
compared with the sweeping U.S. reforms. 
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Both countries also implemented more major reforms through the executive 
branch than I originally anticipated. Not surprisingly, Great Britain's largest changes 
were the result of direct action by the Prime Minister and his cabinet. 
2. Limitations of Study 
Although these findings support the claims made by scholars that the U.S changes 
were massive in scale after 9-11, because the study was focused on a two year block of 
time, it was difficult to make generalizations about the full makeup of the domestic 
security changes in the U.S. and U.K. For instance, the study did not prove Britain's 
policy changes were "not going far enough" as some experts claimed. 
85 
CHAPTER VI 
REASONS WHY WE SEE DIVERSITY OF POST-BOMBING CHANGES 
There are several possible explanations for why we see the different magnitude of 
change in the U.K. and U.S. following the two bombings. This section will address 
several of the most prominent theories within the security literature. I will also consider 
explanations not widely noted by scholars while issuing my own viewpoints on the 
respective theories throughout. While I found no established form of categorization in 
the security literature, I've put the explanations into three broad categories in an effort to 
properly organize the research for the reader. 
1. Difference in the Policy Challenge 
Nature ofAttack/Threats 
Common explanations for why the U.S. change was larger than Britain's are 
provided by analysts who feel the U.S. had greater security needs than the U.K. at the 
time of the two bombings. A similar explanation uses the unequal size of the 9-11 attack 
and the U.S. country as whole, compared with the smaller London bombings and British 
population, as the rationale for the unequal responses. 
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The theory about the size of the U.S. and the 9-11 attacks posits there is little 
surprise in witnessing greater U.S. change, because the 9-11 attacks were ''unique'' and 
unprecedented in scale. In tum, this theory has caused many analysts to shy away from 
9-11 comparisons as a whole. Looking at the DHS or the spending increases between the 
U.S. and Great Britain is also seen as a biased comparison due the size disparity between 
the two countries. The U.S. must link up its 50 states throughout expansive territory, 
while the U.K. has fewer people and a smaller land mass. Therefore, the theory assumes 
no change the size of the DHS would have needed to develop in the U.K. after the 7-7 
bombings because their undersized government lends itself toward smaller-scale 
coordination fixes. 
Nature of Attack Critique 
Resolving the debate over the "uniqueness" of 9-11 is difficult, but as described 
earlier, there are many commonalties between the U.S. and U.K. and the 9-11 and 7-7 
terrorist attacks. Not only are the U.S. and u.K. both democratic-styled governments, but 
the attacks provided a similar level "focusing event".55 The U.K. had not suffered a 
domestic attack on this scale for many years. Preceding the bombing, as in the U.S. prior 
to 9-11, the British intelligence agencies and citizens were overly-confident in their own 
security.56 Finally, even if the disparity in the attacks and country are distinctive, they 
cannot fully explain the variation of change across the different areas of domestic 
security. 
56 See statements made by Joint Intelligence Committee changing the UK attack level just before 2005 
bombings. 
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Government Capabilities 
The government capabilities theory is investigated by comparing the disparate 
security abilities that existed when the countries were attacked, and by using historical 
examples to explain how the two governmental systems became distinguishable. First, 
I'll address possible historical explanations before using the pre-bombing comparisons to 
reemphasize the different needs/capabilities between the U.S. and U.K. 
The distinct u.K. and U.S. security capabilities can be linked to their long-
established governmental principles and the countries' dissimilar constitutions. For 
instance, U.S. amendments outlawing arrests with no warrant, unreasonable search and 
seizure, and detention without a court trial are not norms in Great Britain. These 
amendments partially explain how the U.S. courts are stronger than in the UK and why 
the relationship between domestic intelligence and security agencies work closer with the 
local police forces in Great Britain than in America. More generally, these amendments 
help explain "why the UK approach to counterterrorism would be difficult to duplicate in 
the U.S." (Lewis testimony 2006,2). Another example to support the capability theory is 
viewed in investigating the U.S. and British security powers. One distinction between the 
security structures is that Britain can go further in targeting terrorists,57 while the U.S. 
courts playa larger role in influencing security legislation. The FISA court established in 
the 1970s is an example of the U.S. courts power (Tsoukala, Anastassia 2006,607-27). 
One final governmental comparison lends credence to this explanation. A recent 
RAND study found the U.K. administrative bureaucracies and police structures were 
57 The differing policies can be traced back to the Bill ofRights in the U.S. Constitution which forbids 
unreasonable search and seizure, and arrests with no warrant. 
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more centralized than institutions found in the U.S. (55). The structures have been in 
place for many years, which makes them difficult to change in a short period of time. 
Thus, the older, more centralized agencies in the U.K. affected their level of post-attack 
reform. 
The second primary difference in capability is tied to the more recent efforts by 
the U.S. and U.K. to re-make their respective domestic security structures. Most notably, 
the different levels of change between the British homeland security and 
police/intelligence categories, and the massive U.S. reorganization via the DHS, can be 
attributed to the varying limitations ofthe respective agencies in both countries prior to 
the attacks. For example, before the London Bombings, the British government had 
already made extensive changes to their homeland security based agencies, most notably, 
through the formation of the Civil Contingencies Secretariat. In tum, the organizational 
efficiency and the efforts ofBritain's first-responders were lauded in the summer of 
2005. As the theory would predict, the British changes were less prevalent in the 
homeland security field in the two years after the 2005 bombings. 
In the U.S., the largest changes were seen in the areas most-commonly cited as 
needing comprehensive reform prior to 9-11. The Gilmore Commission, the most well­
known pre-911 security review, found the lack of a U.S. homeland security agency to be 
one of the most pressing concerns for the U.S. domestic security structure. The 
formation of the Department ofHomeland Security represented the biggest post 9-11 
change, which again supports the capabilities explanation. 
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The distinct timing of the two attacks is also linked to the capabilities theory. The 
array of important counter-terror legislation referenced in the pre-attack section shows 
how 9-11 caused Britain to change and re-tool their security functions before the London 
bombings. By the time the u.K. was attacked in July of2005, their domestic security 
agencies were already more secure, which provided less incentive to restructure their 
agencies. Several provisions in Britain's Anti-Terrorism and Security Act passed in 
December of2001, covered functions taken up by the DHS in the U.S. Again, supporting 
the notion that Britain's capabilities outpaced the Americans at the time ofthe respective 
attacks. 
Britain's Chatham House think tank provides a final example for the policy 
challenge explanation. In a recent think tank report analyzing Britain's domestic security 
agencies, the Chatham House created a section titled "principal legislation." The 
"primary" acts consisted of the Terrorism Act 2000, the Anti-terrorism Crime and 
Security act 2001, the Civil Contingencies Act 2004, and the Terrorism Act 2006. Ofthe 
British acts listed as "primary," only one (Terrorism Act 2006) was implemented after the 
London bombings. 
Policy Challenge/Capabilities Theory Critique 
The diverse levels of change found prior to the 9-11 attacks and 2005 London 
bombings presents a valid explanation regarding the different magnitude ofpost-attack 
change in the U.S. and Great Britain. The nature of the current research endeavor, 
however, precludes this explanation from becoming the central rationale behind the 
studies results. Before beginning the comparative analysis of the post-attack changes, the 
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author noted the different timing of the two events and the level of advancement between 
the U.S. and U.K. security infrastructure at the time of the two attacks. So, while these 
explanations contribute to the overall policies implemented after the bombings, because 
they were recognized as intervening variables, they do not provide the most 
comprehensive conclusions for the purposes ofthis study. 
2. Different Views in Leadership 
Although President Bush and Prime Minster Blair were known to have a close 
relationship, scholars and critics have commonly noted the two leaders have distinct 
beliefs about how they view the world. The stereotypical view is that Bush holds a 
Manichean view of the world while Blair espouses a belief in multiculturalism. While at 
times the two leaders' actions fall under both leadership ideals, this theory contends that a 
majority of their actions fit under the separate categorizations. A broader interpretation 
of the same argument divides the viewpoints of the political left and right wing into these 
categories as well (Left/Multicultural vs. Right/Manichean). In recent book titled 
Partisan Interventions, Brian Rathbun argues that political party differences cause 
individuals to view the world in distinct ways, and, in turn, the domestic divide affects 
the outcome ofmajor international events. Rathbun says leftist political parties espouse 
less use force and more cooperation to achieve their objectives than those on the right. 
In turn, this section also reviews the domestic response in the U.S. and U.K. to see ifthe 
actions of the left and right support a similar explanation. If the theory holds true we 
should see liberal democrats in the U.S. supporting Blair/policies ofcooperation and less 
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intervention and British conservatives supporting Bush/policies of intervention for more 
individualistic reasons. 
u.s. Viewpoints 
In viewing the security responses in the U.S. after 9-11, there are several 
examples which link Bush's actions with the Manichean theory. A popular example is 
Bush's use of the prison in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba to hold individuals deemed "enemy 
combatants" of the United States. Since 9-11, Bush has continued to insist any Al-Qaeda 
or Taliban suspects held at Guantanamo Bay do not qualify for protection under the 
Geneva Convention, and are subject to military tribunals. The debate continues in the 
U.S. courts and between left-wing Democrats and right-wing Republicans. 
The reaction ofleftists in the U.S. also corresponded with the Rathbun theory. 
There are several examples ofDemocrats speaking out against the quick method of 
response utilized by Bush. The speedy passage of the Patriot Act, the objections to 
forming the Department ofHomeland Security, and the formation of the Terrorist Threat 
and Integration Center (TTIC) are all examples ofthe Democrats opposing the large­
magnitude approach. For example, Congressional Democrats were against Bush 
implementing HSPD 6 which quickly established the TTIC. Lastly, instead of 
disagreeing with Prime Minister Blair's approach, many of the civil libertarians in the 
U.S. and others on the left thought Blair's multicultural approach better represented their 
own viewpoint of the world. A Pew Global poll conducted in 2006, a period when the 
Iraq War was unpopular, found that two in three Americans had confidence in Tony 
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Blair. 88% ofRepublicans and a majority ofDemocrats (55%) and independents (63%) 
were confident in Blair. 
UK post-attackpolitics/multiculturalism 
In Great Britain there is also evidence the liberals in Britain were against the use 
of force while conservatives were often promoting intervention. In the International 
Affairs article Commentariat and Discourse Failure: Language and Atrocity in Cool 
Britannia, scholars David Martin Jones and M.L.R. Smith describe how ''the 
contradictory character of the politics ofmulticultural complacency" which had 
developed within the Labor Party caused British leaders to respond in unique fashion 
after the attacks. The authors recount how members of the Labor party and civil 
libertarian organizations complained the government was using the "politics of fear" to 
overemphasize the terrorist threat. Jones also said prior to the attacks, the "prevailing 
academic and media orthodoxy" was that the British government "manufactured a 
'politics of fear' in order to marginalize the Muslim voice" (1090). In actuality, before 
the bombings the British government expresses an excessive degree of sensitivity to 
Muslim values, which was most notable through the "political ideology of 
multiculturalism" (1090). 
Blair's government became preoccupied with preserving "harmonious community 
relations" (1091) after the attacks as well. For example, after the London Bombings, 
Deputy Assistant Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police Brian Paddick remarked how 
"Islam and terrorism don't go together." Therefore, it was the British government's fear 
ofa Muslim backlash which dictated the immediate construction and response to the 
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terrorist threat (l091 ). 
Immediately following the London bombings, in order to reassure the British 
pubic and foster civilian resiliency, high-ranking members of the security community 
advised the government to simply assume no terrorist threat existed in the U.K. In a 
Chatham House briefmg paper in July of2005, Bill Durodie said, "We should remind 
ourselves that there have been few significant terrorist attacks in the developed world. To 
suggest otherwise, is both alarmist and disingenuous" (Durodie 2005, 4). Again, policies 
promoting cooperation were evident in the U.K. 
The British media even downplayed the severity ofthe attacks. Less than a week 
after the bombings, the Times ofLondon described the 7-7 bombings as the act of"small 
time losers" (Kaletsky 2005), whereas 7 days after 9-11, the U.S. Congress was passing 
the "Use ofForce" Resolution (pL 107-40) and cable stations were still showing planes 
crashing into the World Trade Center Towers. 
As the academic proponents of this "policy ofcomplacency" were faced with the 
realization the terrorist attacks were perpetrated by British-born Muslims, they sought to 
"export the responsibility for the 7/7 attacks" (Jones and Smith 2006, 1093). Britain's 
involvement in the Iraq War, not their lack of security reform, then, became a popular 
argument among Britons for why they were dealt the 2005 bombings. 
After the London Bombings, Tony Blair, and the majority ofBritain's political 
and media establishment were concerned about maintaining peace with the Muslim 
community. As a result, they committed to promoting counter-terror policies which 
centered on diversity and "multiculturalism." The belief that actions promoting diversity 
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would lead to hannony with Muslims was called the "default" position of "Blairism" 
(Martin and Jones 1083). One year after the attack Blair recognized the multicultural 
approach was not succeeding. In August of2006, Blair called for a "rethink on the war 
on terror strategy and an 'alliance ofmoderation'" to combat extremism. Instead of a 
"rethink," commentators called this a "return to the muddled multicultural approach to 
the 'war' that Blair announced in Sept. 2001" ("Blair's Multicultural Stance," the 
Australian, 8/3/06). 
Leadership Theory Critique 
The amount of influence the particular policies of "Blairism" or multiculturalism 
had on retarding the U.K.'s post-attack changes is still uncertain, but evidence suggests 
the British Labor party and the British cO:J;lservatives were at odds regarding its post­
attack domestic security agenda. Members of the Labor party, the British media, and 
British citizens displayed a greater willingness to pursue policies or methods analysts 
considered weak, lending support to the leadership argument. Yet, rallying against the 
"politics of fear," promoting multiculturalism, and playing down the severity of the 
terrorist threat, were not the only tactics and sentiments pursued in the U.K. in the two 
years after the bombings. The study showed that as Blair was losing support he largely 
abandoned the multicultural approach, and instead more structural changes were put in 
place. Blair's Home Office reorganization in April--which was opposed by many in the 
U.K. and criticized in the liberal British media--had the support of the conservatives in 
the British security community to provide consensus for the reforms. In the U.S. the 
majority ofDemocrats did support Tony Blair and there was opposition from the left 
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regarding Bush's counter-terror agenda, but after 9-11 the Democrats largely united 
behind Bush which enabled a more aggressive security agenda. While there is 
significant support for the Rathbun and left/right leadership theory, from the 
aforementioned examples and the relevance of the political capitol article discussed 
below, we will discover the leadership theory does not provide the most persuasive 
reasoning to explain the studies findings. 
3. Differences in Political Support/Capital 
The final theory uses the varying levels ofpolitical capitol and support in the U.S. 
and U.K. to explain why the British post 7-7 response was smaller in scale than the U.S. 
post 9-11 response. This explanation runs counter to the prior leadership argument. 
Instead of the predisposition ofBush and Blair's leadership views causing the different 
magnitude of change, the argument assumes Blair attempted to put in place a larger post­
attack security response, but suggests it was the varying levels ofpolitical capitol and 
support which were the primary reasons Britain made fewer reforms after the 7-7 attacks. 
This section looks at the common reasons why political capitol may have been different 
in the U.S. and Great Britain before noting which aspects of the theory are most 
persuasive. 
Experience with Terror 
A common position assumed by security scholars is the notion that a countries' 
past experience with terror influences their future response. In this case, Great Britain 
96 
was viewed as having a long history of confronting domestic terrorism with the IRA. 
The U.S. was seen as having little experience with domestic terrorism. In tum, the 
varying levels ofpast experience can explain why the political elites felt less pressure to 
make major security changes after the London bombings. 
British Terror Experience 
Britain developed significant experience in fighting terrorism with the Irish 
Republican Army in the 1970s and 1980s. Today's terrorist threat is unique from the 
Ireland case, but several scholars contend the British security agency had more tools in 
place in 2005 because of the fierce battles which took place decades earlier. Dan Jones 
argues that the U.S. had little experience with terrorism when compared with Britain's 
dealings with the IRA (Jones 2005,346). Tom Parker, a former British Counterterrorism 
Official, elucidates the British perspective regarding past experiences saying: 
"Bear in mind, this is not a new experience for us. We have had terrorist bombings in 
London going back now 120 years. I cannot think: of a decade since the 1880s when a 
terrorist bomb has not exploded in London, whether it is Russian anarchists or the 
Fenians or the Provisional IRA, the Angry Brigade, the Animal Liberation Front, 
Hezbollah, al Qaeda. We have had pretty much everybody pass through London and kill 
somebody or blow something up, and this is a feature ofour lives, and the state has been 
dealing with it continually for a long period without losing the public's confidence. Add 
to that two world wars on top of that, with the inevitably increased security regime that 
that entails" (Senate 2006) 
Commentary after the 2005 bombings which centered on the resiliency of the 
British people, also used Britons past history with terrorism to explain why they appeared 
calm after the attacks. David Plotz's description, linking Britain's past history and 
experience with their recent resiliency, encapsulates the majority ofpost-bombing 
accounts. Plotz recalled: 
"The reaction to today's attacks feels incredibly English. When I left the quiet area right 
around the bus bombing and returned to the busy streets of Holbom and Soho, London 
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appeared just as it always is. The natural state ofthe English is a kind ofgloomy 
diligence, which is why they do so well in hard times. In 1940, Londoners went dutifully 
on with their business while the Luftwaffe bombed the hell out ofthem. Today, most of 
them are doing the same. I was in Washington for 9/11, and the whole city went into a 
panic. Offices emptied, stores shut, downtown D.C. became a ghost town. But in London 
today, everyone still has a cell phone clutched to their ear. The delivery vans are still 
racing about, seeking shortcuts around all the street closures. The Starbucks is packed" 
(Slate.com).58 
Thus, the theory claims Britain's past history of terrorism caused its citizens to not 
overreact to the London bombings. The more measured behavior dampened the impact 
of the public's pressure and the general urgency ofBritish lawmakers to implement major 
reforms. In the U.S., the American public was largely viewed as more reactionary and 
patriotic following 9-11 which made it easier for major legislation to win support of 
Democrats and Republicans in Congress. 
European Rationality/Policy Traditions vs. U.S. Manichean/Policy Traditions 
Similar to earlier claims, the varying nature of British and American cultures and 
government structures are used explain the varied level of political support in the two 
countries. The U.S. has been viewed as being naive and Manichean in their counter­
terror approach. The U.K., on the other hand, is referenced by scholars as being more 
rational and mature than their American allies. The argument also relies on the 
comparison of the two countries' different traditions ofpolicymaking. This section 
58Additional examples ofLondoners calm and resiliency can be found at: 
http://www.prospect.orglweb/page.ww?section=root&name=ViewPrint&articleld=10006 
98 
looks at the cultural-based arguments followed by the distinction between the countries 
political bodies. 
As previously mentioned, the idea British and American citizens have different 
reactions to fear is commonly used as justification for their post-attack policies. In a 
comparative study of terrorism in U.S. and British elections, Sarah Oates and Andrew 
Williams found British citizens had a "more rational" approach to terrorism than 
Americans. Oates and Williams' claimed Americans and Britons were distinctive in how 
they viewed the two attacks saying, "The British respondents grasped the London 
bombings - and the more distant event of 9/11 - as episodic in nature. On the other hand, 
the U.S. respondents attached weight, importance and significance to 9/11 that is difficult 
to rationalize" (2004, 10-11). The authors suggested British experience with terrorism 
could have contributed to their "less emotive response to the notion of terrorism on their 
home soil," while they believed the U.S. media contributed to what they called 
Americans "irrational fear" of terrorism (Oates and Williams). 
The U.S. and U.K. distinctive terrorism and homeland security definitions are also 
used to explain why the U.S. and Great Britain diverged in their post-attack policies. In 
the U.K. terrorism is treated as a civil crime while in the U.S. it can be viewed as an act 
ofwar (Cornish 2007, 10). The British security community is also quick to make the 
point that in Great Britain terrorism is treated as "one ofa number ofcauses of 
emergency" (Cornish 2007, 10) which require several government agencies coordinating 
a response depending on the incident. These two statements by Britain's security elites 
imply that the U.S. "war-based" approach is unnecessary and overly aggressive, and 
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indicative ofa country without the same amount ofcounter-terror experience. 
Regardless, the lack ofa DHS-equivalent agency in Great Britain shows how Britain did 
not assume the u.s. style approach after the London bombings (Cornish). 
Additionally, in the U.S., President Bush dubbed the fight a "War on Terror," 
whereas those in Great Britain have shied away from this characterization. In December 
of2006, cabinet ministers in Britain were instructed by the Foreign Office to stop using 
the phrase "War on Terror." The Guardian explained the rationale behind the switch 
saying, "Many senior British politicians and counter-terrorism specialists have always 
been uneasy with the term 'the war on terror', coined by the White House in the week 
following the 9/11 attacks, arguing that the tenn risked inflaming opinions worldwide. 
Other critics said that it was too 'military' and did not adequately describe the nature of 
the diverse efforts made to counter the new threat" (Burke 2006). 
The U.S. represented the "hard" military style approach while others in Europe 
and in Great Britain promoted the "soft power" or political approaches in tackling 
terrorism (Burke). Inherent in this debate are the ideas of anti-Americanism and British 
disagreement regarding its involvement in the Iraq War. The debate about the Iraq War 
soon fed into an idea that there were two distinct methods of fighting terror generally. 
The different philosophy in domestic security policies was even acknowledged by Tony 
Blair. For instance, in March of, 2004 Tony Blair "observed that the Madrid bombings 
had exacerbated the divergence between the United States and Europe" (Thachuk 1). The 
different definition explanations are recognized in the security community, most 
commonly in the homeland security and disaster research texts. Again, it is assumed the 
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political support for major domestic security reform was smaller in the U.K. due to their 
unique counter-terrorlhomeland security approach. 
Different u.s. and British policymaking traditions are also used to justify why the 
U.S. implemented more sweeping policy reforms. British policy-especially foreign and 
domestic security policy-is made with much greater involvement by permanent expert 
civil servants, working within an old tradition ofBritish diplomacy, whereas U.s. policies 
are almost entirely crafted by politicians who are not experts and who often have 
electoral incentives to play up panics. Therefore, after 9-11 the U.s. policymakers were 
inherently more prone to quickly execute great reforms to garner political support, while 
British civil servants could take more time and had less of a tendency to push through 
major legislation. 
Support for the premise U.S. reforms were pursued by non-experts can be seen 
with the problems associated with the homeland security changes. After the Bush 
administration resisted the move by Senator Lieberman to enact his bill to create a new 
Department ofHomeland Security, they realized the American public and those in 
Congress supported the proposal. As a result, Bush asked several of his senior aides to 
pursue a top-secret effort to form a new plan for a major reorganization which would 
create a Department of Homeland Security and transfer the functions of other agencies 
(Ornstein and Mann 130-131). Political motives also caused the U.S. Congress to 
navigate through as many as 88 committees and subcommittees which sought jurisdiction 
over homeland security affairs (153), which further supports the policymaking 
explanation. 
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Evidence of British policymaker's lack of panic can be seen with their statements 
minimizing the terror threat before and after the attacks, and downplaying the 
significance of the attacks. As we have seen in previous sections, there was an attempt 
by members of the British government to simply deny a terror threat existed after 7-7. 
Just before the 2005 attacks senior intelligence staffers composed in the JTAC issued a 
memo which said no group currently had the capability to attack the U.K. 
Prime Minister Power 
Britain's Prime Minister historically has greater ability to implement legislation in 
a timelier manner than Presidents in the U.S. system. With party control in the British 
Parliament, the Prime Minister rarely encounters the type of push-back from Parliament 
that Presidents typically find when dealing with the U.S. Congress. Therefore, with all 
political circumstances being equal, Blair should have been more proficient in passing 
legislation than Bush. 
The role of the British Prime Minister is not easy to define because there is no 
formal prime ministerial job description. Yet, Richard Heffernan explains how the Prime 
Minister only needs two things to operate effectively: 1.) Power over their Parliamentary 
majority and 2.) Power within the government they lead. In 2005, Heffernan notes how 
Blair does not have a monopoly ofpower, but does have "extensive authority" (2005, 
605). 
Bush and Presidential Power 
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In turn, Blair's reduced political capitol would not be enough to explain why the 
U.S. produced a greater amount ofpost-attack legislation unless President Bush took the 
lead role in setting the agenda following 9-11. Although there is a precedent establishing 
the agenda setting role or President's during times of crisis, (Owens 2006, 261) President 
Bush gained more power than usualfor an American President from 20Ot-2003. As Ivo 
Daalder explains, "The depth ofCongress's deference partly reflected the enormity of the 
attacks and a principled beliefthat lawmakers should defer to strong presidential 
leadership in times ofnational crisis. Rather than blaming Bush for failing to anticipate 
the attacks (as was the case with Blair and the London bombings), Americans rallied 
around him" (93). 9-11 created a perfect storm which allowed Bush to implement several 
large-scale reforms. The majority ofU.S. Congress, the public, and countries across the 
world rallied in support of the United States after 9-11, which allowed Bush to emerge as 
"an exceptionally bold president in the legislative arena, governing as ifhe had won in a 
landslide" (Mann and Ornstein 2006, 123). 
President Bush was widely recognized as being aggressive in implementing 
policy while expanding the powers of the Presidency. When Presidents take unilateral 
action it is usually a sign they are declaring a policy they could not pass through ordinary 
congressional lawmaking (Owens). The series of important Presidential directives passed 
by President Bush after 9-11 is a primary example of the large amount ofpolitical capitol 
he developed after 9-11. 
The popular theory of"punctuated equilibrium" (Baumgartner and Jones 1993) 
argues "that rapid changes in or external shocks to, domestic and international society 
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imposes new and insistent demands on the state. In so doing, these demands generate 
important and decisive moments of institutional mobilization and creativity, disrupt the 
preexisting, relatively stable, equilibrium between the Congress and the president, and 
precipitate decisions or nondecisions by the electorate and political leaders that define the 
contours for action when the next crisis or external shock occurs" (Owens 2006, 261­
263). The London bombings caused a similar-style focusing event in Great Britain in 
2005, but because Blair's relationship with Parliament and the courts was unstable before 
the external shock, Britain was unable to capitalize on the potentially decisive moment of 
institutional mobilization. 
Congress, traditionally a primary check to the President's power permitted almost 
all ofBush's major and most controversial actions after 9-11. For example, Congress did 
not block Bush's executive order which put suspected members ofAl Qaeda, such as 
Jose Padilla, essentially beyond the reach ofU.S. law (Daalder and Lindsay 2003, 93). 
Congress did not intervene when Bush lifted CIA restrictions to operate covertly or when 
he approved the roundup of thousands ofMuslim and Arab men (93). Most notably, less 
than a month after 9-11, Congress passed essentially intact the administration's proposed· 
USA Patriot Act (93). 
A final example ofBush's unprecedented ease in overstepping Congress was the 
formation of the Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC). Bush learned Congress was 
seeking to make a similar style change, so he created the agency via Presidential 
directive. "With soaring approval ratings, the president's powers ofpersuasion enabled 
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him to win strong congressional approval for terrorist- and war-related legislation" 
(Owens) over the course of the two year period analyzed for this research endeavor. 
How Iraq Hurt Blair 
President Bush and Prime Minister Blair encountered two distinct domestic 
political landscapes in 2001 and 2005 respectively. The Iraq War was linked to the 
London bombings immediately after the incident. On July 8, 2005, one day after the 
bombings, a respected MP George Galloway stated that Londoners have "paid the price" 
for the Afghanistan and Iraq wars (Ball 2006). Leading British think tanks, like the 
Chatham House, linked the cause of the bombings with Britain's presence in Iraq. 
After the London Bombings as critics began using Iraq as the rationale behind the 
suicide bombings, Blair did everything he could to distance the Iraq War from the recent 
domestic attacks. Blair was firm in his view that the terrorist problem did not arise out of 
Iraq. Shortly after the bombings, when Blair was asked about the notion Britain was 
becoming a breeding ground for terrorists, he asserted the problem started not in the 
U.K., but "beyond our shores" (PM Briefing Notes). However, by 2005, the majority of 
Britons had lost their faith in Blair. A Guardian/ICM poll conducted two weeks after the 
attack revealed 33% of Britons thought Blair bears "a lot" of responsibility for the 
London bombings and an additional 31 % said Blair "a little" responsibility (Glover). 
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"The War on Terror and specifically the campaign in Iraq have largely altered the 
Blairite agenda, which in 1997 centered on improving economic prosperity and 
enhancing social justice" (Kfir 2006, 12-13). The leaking of a top-secret TIC 
memorandum claimed Britain's role in Iraq had caused Britain to be a terrorist target for 
years to come (Kfir 2006, 13). This, ofcourse went against Blair's claims after the July 
2005 bombings that Iraq had nothing to do with domestic terrorism and was actually 
helping their anti-terror efforts. In short, the revelation further weakened Tony Blair's 
power. 
Blair continued to deny the linkage between Iraq and the London bombings and 
often shifted the focus of the debate when pressed on Iraq. And when Blair did make 
domestic security changes, many feared it was simply a way for him to avoid the negative 
comparisons between the Iraq invasion and homegrown terrorism. Thus, some in Britain 
were been unhappy with what they saw as a lack of focus in pursuing terrorists. Blair's 
backing of the U.S. invasion ofIraq and his subsequent unpopularity also spilled over to 
hinder the effectiveness ofBritain's counter-terror policies. Since, Blair was so maligned 
within the British government; he couldn't lead as he once did. Dr. Isaac Kfrr of the 
Institute for Counter-Terrorism Policy (ICT) claims ''the campaign to strengthen Britain's 
position in the War on Terror has suffered due to lack of cohesion. Decisions made by 
the executive branch are increasingly coming under criticism from the public, legislature, 
and the judiciary" (Kfrr 2006, 13). The poor cohesion among Britain's government 
bodies caused the country to appear to be divided, which then caused the terrorists to 
believe they were winning the war (14). 
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Political Capitol/Support Theory Critique 
Even as I agreed with the general scope of the political capitol explanation, some 
aspects were less convincing than others. The experience and stereotypical culture 
beliefs had less support than the policy making and political environment aspects of the 
theory. Evidence suggests the U.S. had prior experience with terrorism which would 
lessen the structural advantage past experience provided Great Britain. And in a recent 
CSIS study comparing the U.S. and European notions of the terror threat, researchers 
found the "differences among discussants...were minimal and more often rhetorical" 
(CSIS 2004). The researchers concluded that any differences in the way citizens viewed 
the "war" on terror, did not affect the resulting counter-terror policies. "Differences of 
opinion in the broader public on these issues reflect differing political contexts and 
cultural characteristics that have little to do with the terrorist phenomenon" (2004). 
The definitions explanations were useful when breaking down the two countries 
homeland security philosophies. The countries do diverge on defining "homeland 
security," but both countries are looking to anticipate and respond quickly to any 
potential attacks, and there is a great deal ofcollaboration and carry-over among the 
countries methods. For example, Britain's "Four P" policy is similar to the U.S. strategy 
for Homeland Security. Overall, the different definitions should be helpful for those 
looking to understand the countries' domestic security approaches, but it is unclear how 
much affect the two philosophies had on the post-attack policies. What is clear, however, 
is the U.S. and the U.K. have worked together and looked to each other to apply effective 
counter-terror policies. Taken as a whole, the similarities are easier to identify when one 
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compares the countries post-attack changes, which led me to assume the definition claims 
had less influence on the magnitude of the post-attack policy responses. 
While these examples were the basis for my assumption that not all aspects of the 
political capitol explanation were reliable, I still found it to be more persuasive than any 
other possible conclusions. Other than the political capitol explanation, the needs-based 
theory served as the best explanation for the different post-attack responses. The large 
number ofchanges implemented in the U.K. prior to the London bombings altered the 
nature of the policies implemented from 2005-2007. Even though one assumes Britain 
would have attempted to make similar changes after the London bombings had they not 
implemented them prior to 2005, the needs/policy explanation was not the primary 
justification for the magnitude ofchange because the outside influence of the Iraq War 
would have still slowed the rate at which the security changes were implemented. Thus, 
the needs/policy challenge critique was not placed ahead of the political support 
explanation. The fmal section provides further support for these conclusions. 
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CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSION 
After analyzing the data and prior explanations I assert Prime Minister Tony 
Blair's lack ofpolitical capitol, largely the result ofopposition to Britain's involvement 
in the 2003 invasion of Iraq, is the best explanation to explain why the United Kingdom 
implemented less legislation after the London bombings than the U.S. after 9-11. The 
popularity ofBush and Blair and the impact ofthe Iraq War, different policymaking 
traditions, and the general political strength ofthe President and Prime Minister are the 
central comparisons used to support this explanation. 
While there is no exact measure analyzing the Prime Minister's political power or 
influence, evidence from this section revealed how Tony Blair faced a growing number 
of obstacles in his efforts to pass significant legislation over his final two years in power. 
After 9-11, Bush had an optimal period to bring about major reforms with approval 
ratings hovering above 80%. During much ofthe time Tony Blair had to implement 
reforms after the London bombings, however, he experienced far less political support. 
The chart below shows the ebb and flow ofthe approval rankings for Tony Blair in Great 
Britain. Similar to Bush, Blair's approval rating was extremely high during the first few 
years ofhis term. A severe drop in approval is seen from during the debate surrounding 
the Iraq War which brought his approval rating down to 30% in 2004. Immediately 
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following the 2005 London attacks Blair's approval rose to around 45%, but he never 
was able to obtain the approval of the majority ofBritons following the bombings. As 
the patriotic sentiment from the bombings wore off and new political scandals developed, 
his approval ratings bottomed out under 30% (BBC News 2007). 
Figure 1. Timeline ofTony BlairApprovalRatings 1997-2007 
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Further, the security legislation and policy decisions enacted after the September 11 
attacks saw a largely unified response between President Bush and U.S. Congress, 
compared with the more divided response between Tony Blair and Parliament following 
the London Bombings. Blair's Labor party won the 2005 election with a significantly 
smaller number of seats (Dumbrell2006, 466). The Prime Minister's reduced majority 
also made it more difficult for him to push any significant domestic security changes 
through Parliament (Archick 2005, 5). 
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The different policymaking traditions between Great Britain and the U.S. were 
also good methods of explaining the results. Surprisingly, the power of the President 
increased after 9-11 and Tony Blair had less ability to utilize his more efficient tools as 
Prime Minister. 
It also is important to recall Blair was unable to pass all of the security legislation 
he presented to Parliament after 7-7. The most prominent example is the Parliament's 
rejection ofBlair's efforts to extend the length of time a terror subject can be held 
without charge in the 2006 Terrorist Act. Blair's position was characterized as extreme 
in the media, but the amendment was backed by Britain's police and intelligence 
community. Blair's successor, Gordon Brown, has also expressed willingness to bring 
similar legislation back to Parliament for a vote. Even though it was difficult to access 
the Prime Minister's proposed actions, the fact that Blair was dealt a public defeat at the 
hands of several ofLabor MP's, was widely seen as an indication he had lost much of the 
political capitol he once established. With this said, if Blair was not associated with the 
2003 invasion of Iraq, I would have expected his political capitol to have been much 
higher after the 2005 London bombings. This increase in capitol would have allowed 
him to pass the 2006 terrorist provision, and perhaps implement more major post-attack 
security changes as well. 
Final Summary/Future Research 
The primary assumptions regarding the magnitude of the U.S. and British 
responses were supported in the research fmdings. The overall conclusions, however, 
were not as straightforward as it's been previously suggested. The thesis addressed a 
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question in the field of domestic or national security-- a subject area that has become 
increasingly difficult to categorize over time. The comparison also analyzed attacks 
which took place in different countries, several years apart. As a result, the findings were 
best judged when I attempted to break-down particular areas of domestic security. While 
the police/intelligence and homeland security legislation was sometimes interrelated, this 
enabled additional conclusions to be drawn from the research. 
In addition to providing further evidence the security field is fragmented, the 
project also showed how many new areas of research can be explored relating to the 9-11 
and 2005 London bombings. Investigating why the magnitude ofthe two responses was 
distinctive is an area which presents a wide variety of options for new research 
endeavors. In the end, whether one chooses to investigate a similar topic or not, this 
project showed me that research which pursues answers to timely questions will always 
be of importance. 
112 
REFERENCES 
Archick, Kristin. 2007. The United Kingdom: Issues for the United States. July 16, 
2007. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service (CRS) Reports and Issue Briefs. 
__. 2006a. The United States and Europe: Possible Options for u.s. Policy. January 
23,2006. Washington, DC: CRS Reports and Issue Briefs. 
__. 2006b. U.S.-EU Cooperation Against Terrorism. October 16,2006. Washington, 
DC: CRS Reports and Issue Briefs. 
__. 2005. The United Kingdom: Issues for the United States. September 23, 2005. 
Washington, DC: CRS Reports and Issue Briefs. 
Archick, Kristin, Carl Ek, Paul Gallis, Francis T. Miko, and Steven Woehrel. 2006. 
European Approaches to Homeland Security and Counterterrorism. July 24, 2006. 
Washington, DC: CRS Reports and Issue Briefs. 
The Australian. "Blair's Multicultural Stance." August 3,2006. 
Ball, James. 2006. After the bombs: The key political events that followed the London 
bombings. July 4, 2006. The Guardian. 
http://www.guardian.co.uklattackonlondonistory/O,,1812299,00.html 
BBC News. 2005. "Blair: Iraq no excuse for terror." July 26,2005. 
http://news.bbc.co.ukl1Ihi/uk politics/4716505.stm 
BBC News 2007. "Tony Blair: Highs and Lows." May 10,2007. 
http://news.bbc.co.ukllIhi/uk politics/4717504.stm#bombs 
Belgium House of Representatives. 2005. Speech by Ambassador Tom.Korologos. 
Federal Parliament. Brussels, Belgium: October 18, 2005. 
Birkland, Thomas A. 2006. Lessons ofDisaster: Policy Change After Catastrophic 
Events. Washington, D.C: Georgetown University Press. 
Burke, Jason. 2006. The Guardian. 
http://politics.guardian.co.uk/terrorism/story/0,,2058786,00.html 
113 
Callahan, Kathe, Melvin J. Dubnik, and Dorothy Olshfski. "War Narratives: Framing 
Our Understanding of the War on Terror." Public Administration Review, July/August 
2006. 
Chalk, Peter and William Rosenau. 2004. Confronting the "Enemy Within" Security 
Intelligence, the Police, and Counterterrorism in Four Democracies. Arlington, VA: 
RAND Corporation. 
Conetta, Carl. 2006. "War & consequences: Global terrorism has increased since 9/11 
attacks." Project on Defense Alternatives Briefing Memo #38. September 25,2006. 
Compilation of Presidential Documents, 2001, 1568) (November 5,2001), v.37 n.44, 
p.1568-1570 
Conley, Richard. 2006. "Reform, Reorganization, and the Renaissance of the 
Managerial Presidency: The Impact of9/11 on the Executive Establishment." Politics &
 
Policy, 34 (2):304-342.
 
Cornish, Paul. 2007. "Domestic Security, Civil Contingencies, and Resilience in the
 
United Kingdom: A Guide to Policy." The Chatham House. London, England: June
 
2007.
 
Crotty, William Edt. 2004. The Politics ofTerror. Boston, MA: Northeastern University
 
Press.
 
Cusick, James. 2007. "Home Office Split 'only the beginning"'. April 10, 2007.
 
Sunday Herald
 
CSIS "Transatlantic Dialogue on Terrorism" 2004).
 
Daalder, Ivo H. and James M. Lindsay. 2003. America Unbound. Washington, DC:
 
Brookings Institution Press.
 
Dalgaard-Nielsen, Anja. 2004. "Homeland Security. American and European Responses
 
to September 11th." In The Politics ofEuropean Security, edited by Jess Pilegaard,
 
Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies.
 
Department of Transport Website. dft.gov.uk/
 
Dobson, William J. 2006. "The Day Nothing Much Changed." Foreign Policy. Sept­

Oct., 22-25.
 
Dumbrell, John. "Working with Allies: The United States, the United Kingdom, and the
 
War on Terror." Politics & Policy, Volume 34, No.2 (2006): 452-472.
 
114 
Durodie, Bill. 2006. Chatham House Briefing Paper. "Terrorism and community
 
resilience: a UK perspective," Security, terrorism in the UK.
 
Edwards, Charlie. 2007. The Case for a National Security Strategy. Demos Report.
 
security(a>,demos.co.uk
 
English People's Daily. 2005 "British lawmakers vote for 28-day detention rule for
 
terror bill." November 10,2005. Accessed at
 
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200511/1 0/eng2005111 0 220211.html
 
Feikert, Clare and Charles Doyle. 2006. Anti-Terrorism Authority Under the Laws ofthe
 
United Kingdom and the United States. September 7,2006. Washington, DC: CRS
 
Reports and Issue Briefs.
 
Firestone, David. 2002. "Tmces of Terror: The Reorganization; Divided House
 
Approves Homeland Security Bill, With Limited Enthusiasm." The New York Times.
 
July 27, AI.
 
Gardiner, Nile and James Phillips. 2005. "The London Bombings:
 
How the U.S. and the U.K. Should Respond." The Backgrounder. July 21, No. 1871.
 
Gardner, Frank:. 2007. "Terror battle at home and abroad", BBC News. May 11.
 
Accessed on November 26,2007. Available online at http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/­

/2/hi/uk news/politics/6525023 .stm.
 
George, Alexander and Andrew Bennett. 2005. Case Studies and Theory Development
 
in the Social Sciences. London, England: MIT Press.
 
Glover, Julian. 2007. "Two-thirds believe London bombings are linked to Iraq war:
 
Labour losing battle to convince public." The Guardian, July 19,2005.
 
Gregory, Frank:, and Paul Wilkinson. 2001. "Riding Pillion for tacking Terrorism is a
 
High Risk Policy," Security, Terrorism and the UK, Chatham House Briefing Paper.
 
Harris Interactive Poll. #45, May 23, 2007Majority of British Adults Believe Tony Blair 
has Weakened Great Britain's Influence 
http://www.harrisinteractive.comlharris poll/index.asp?PID=761 
Hart-Rudman Commission. 2001. Road Map for National Security: Imperative for 
Change. The United States Commission on National Security/21st Century 
Haynes, Wendy. "Seeing Around Comers: Crafting the New Department ofHomeland 
Security" Review of Policy Research, Volume 21, Number 3 (2004) 
115 
Heffernan, Richard. Exploring (and Explaining) the British Prime Minister 
JPIR' 2005 VOL 7, 605-620 
Hitz, Frederick P., and Brian J. Weiss. 2004. "Helping the CIA and FBI Connect the 
Dots in the War on Terror." International Journal ofIntelligence and 
CounterIntelligence, 17:1-41. 
Huntington, Samuel P . 1996 . Th e Clash ofCivilization and the Remaking ofWorld 
Order. London :Touchstone/Simon & Schuster. 
Jacobson, Michael. 2006. The West at War: u.s. and European Counterterrorism 
Efforts, Post-September 11. Washington Institute for Near East Policy: Washington D.C. 
Johnson, Chalmers A . 2000 . Blowback: Th e Costs and Consequences ofAmerican 
Empire. New York :Metropolitan Books. 
Jones, Dan. 2005. "Structures ofBio-terrorismPreparedness in the UK and the US: 
Responses to 9/11 and the Anthrax Attacks." Political Studies Association. 
Jordan, Amos A., William J. Taylor Jr., and Michael J. Mazarr. 1999. American 
National Security 5th Edition. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press 
Kaletsky, Anatole. "The act of small-time losers," The Times, 14 July 2005 
Kapp, Lawrence and Thomas Lum. 2003. Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade: Key 
Issuesfor the 10tfh Congress. January 3, 2003. Washington, DC: Congressional 
Research Service (CRS) Reports and Issue Briefs. 
Kagan, Robert. 2003. OfParadise and Power: America and Europe in the New World 
Order. New York: Knopf. 
Kfir, Isaac. 2006. "British Middle East Policy: The Counterterrorism Dimension." 
Middle East Review ofInternational Affairs. 10 (4) (December). 
London Resilience Team. 2006. Looking Back, Moving Forward. The Multi-Agency 
De-Brief: Lessons Identified and Progress Since the Terrorist Events of7 July 2005. 
London, England: Government Office for London. 
Jones, David Martin and M.L.R Smith. 2006. "The Commentariat and Discourse 
Failure: Language and Atrocity in Cool Britannia." International Affairs 82: 6, 1077­
1100. 
116 
Masse, Todd. 2003. Domestic Intelligence in the United Kingdom: Applicability ofthe 
MI-5 Model to the United States. May 19, 2003. Washington, DC: CRS Reports and 
Issue Briefs 
Mayhew, David. 1991. Divided We Govern: Party Control, Lawmaking, and 
Investigations 1946-1990. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. 
McDaniel, Michael. 2007. The Development and Recognition of Homeland Security
 
Law. Naval Post Graduate School.
 
Moynihan, Donald P. Homeland Security and the U.S. Public
 
Management Policy Agenda Governance: An International Journal ofPolicy,
 
Administration, and Institutions, 18 (2):171-196.
 
Nagel, William C. 2002. The Law Enforcement Approach to Combating Terrorism: An 
Analysis ofus Policy. Thesis. Naval Postgraduate School. 
National Commission on Terrorism. (2000). Countering the Changing Threat of 
International Terrorism.. National Memorial Institute for the Prevention ofTerrorism. 
(Bremer Report.) Accessed on February 19, 2006. Available online at 
http://www.mipt.org /bremerreport.asp. 
National Commission on Terrorism. 2000. Countering the Changing Threat of 
International Terrorism.. National Memorial Institute for the Prevention ofTerrorism. 
(Bremer Report.) Accessed on February 19, 2006. Available online at 
http://www.mipt.org /bremerreport.asp. 
National Defense Panel. 1997. Transforming Defense National Security in the 21st 
Century.. Report. December 9. Accessed on February 19,2006. Available online at 
http://www.fas.org/man/docs/ndp/exec.htm. 
Northouse, Clayton. 2006. Protecting What Matters: Technology, Security, and Liberty 
since 9/11. Brookings Institution Press: Washington, DC. 
O'Connor, Tom R. "Homeland Security in Comparative Perspective. MegaLinks in 
Criminal Justice. Last updated November 4,2007. Available online at 
http://www.apsu.edu/oconnort/3430/3430Iect08b.htm. 
Oates, Sarah. 2005. "Selling fear? The framing of the terrorist threat in elections." 
Security, terrorism in the UK, Chatham House briefmg paper 
Ornstein, Norm and Thomas Mann. 2006. The Broken Branch: How Congress is Failing 
America and How to Get it Back on Track. New York: Oxford. 
117 
Perl, Raphael F. 2006. Terrorism and National Security: Issues and Trends. Apri121, 
2006. Washington, DC: CRS Reports and Issue Briefs. 
Perrow, Charles. 2006. "The Disaster after 9/11: The Department ofHomeland Security 
and the Intelligence Reorganization." Homeland Security Affairs, 2 (1). 
Pew Global. 2006. America's Image Slips, But Allies Share U.S. Concerns Over Iran, 
Hamas No Global Warming Alarm in the U.S., China 6.13.06 
http://pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?PageID=825 
Politics.co.uk. 2006. "Tories: Homeland security minister needed."Accessed at 
http://www.politics.co.uk/issueoftheday/tories-homeland-security-minister-needed­
$441791$441779.htm 
Powell, Richard J. 2004. "The Presidency Responds: The Implications of9/11 for the 
Bush Administration's Policy Agenda." In The Politics ofTerror: The U.S. Response to 
9/11, edited by William Crotty, Boston: Northeastern University Press. 252-277. 
Relyea, Harold. 2003. Executive Branch Reorganization and Management Initiatives 
Updated September 23,2003 Washington, DC: CRS Reports and Issue Briefs. 
Emergency Management in the 21st Century: Dealing with AI Qaeda, Tom Ridge, 
and Julie Gerberding Claire B. Rubin May 2004. Boulder, CO. 
Rubin and Tanali 2004. 
Sarkesian, Sam. J.A. Williams, and Stephen J. Cimbala. 2002. U.s. National Security: 
Policymakers Processes, and Politics. 3rd ed. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. 
Sarotte, Mary Elise. 2005. "Transatlantic Tension and Threat Perception." Naval War 
College Review, 58 (4): 25-37. 
.Sauter, Mark and James Jay Carafano. 2005. Homeland Security: A Complete Guide to 
Understanding, Preventing, and Surviving Terrorism. McGraw Hill: New York. 
Schulhofer, Stephen. 2005. Rethinking the Patriot Act: Keeping America Safe and Free.
 
New York: Century Foundation Press.
 
Shapiro, Jeremy. 2004. Presentation to the Center for European Policy Studies.
 
"Domestic Dilemmas: U.S. Homeland Security Policy and Transatlantic Relations."
 
From the European Security Forum, European Homeland Security, post-March 11th and
 
Transatlantic Implications. Brussels, Belgium, June 7.
 
Spending Review. 2007.
 
Slate.com http://WVlTW.slate.com/id/2122162/
 
118 
Thachuk, Kimberly. 2006. "Countering Terrorism Across the Atlantic?" 
Defense Horizons. July 2006. 
Tierney, Kathleen. 2005. Recent Developments in U.S. Homeland Security Policies and 
Their Implications for the Management ofExtreme Events. Paper presented at the First 
International Conference on Urban Disaster Reduction, Kobe, Japan, January 18-20, 
2005. 
Travis, Alan. 2007. "Reid denies department split will lead to liberal clash with 
hardliners." April 25, 2007 The Guardian 
http://politics.guardian.co.uklterrorism/story/0,,2064875,00.html 
Tsoukala, Anastassia. 2006. "Democracy in the Light of Security: British and French 
Political Discourses on Domestic Counter-Terrorism Policies." Political Studies 54: 607­
27. 
U.K. Cabinet Office. National Intelligence Machinery. Available at 
http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk. 
U.K. Home Secretary. 2006. "Lessons Learned from 7 July." 
U.S. Congress. House ofRepresentatives. House Government Reform Subcommittee on 
National Security, Emerging Threats and International Relations. 2006. Testimony. 
Combating Terrorism: Lessons Learnedfrom London, 109th Congress, 2nd Session. 
James A. Lewis, Center for Strategic and International Studies, September 19, 2006. 
US Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, "Testimony ofWinston Wiley," 2/26/03 
US Senate (Wrightson Testimony, US Senate, 9/9/03 
U.S. Congress. Senate. Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations. 2006. 
Special Hearing. Catching Terrorists: The British Versus the U.S. System, 109th 
Congress, Second Session. Statement ofProfessor John Y00, September 14, 2006. 
__. 2006. Hearing. Catching Terrorists: The British Versus the U.s. System, 109th 
Congress, Second Session. Statement ofTom Parker, September 14, 2006. 
U.S. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. 2004. "The 9/11 
Commission Report (Final)." New York and London: W.W. Norton. 
U.S. State Department, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism. 2006. Country 
Reports on Terrorism: 2005. Released on April 28, 2006. Available online at 
http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2005/64342.htm 
119 
Van Natta Jr., Don. 2005. "For a Decade, London Thrived as a Busy Crossroads of 
Terror." July 10,2005. NY Times. 
Walker, Clive. 2005. "Intelligence and anti-terrorism legislation in the United 
Kingdom," Crime, Law & Social Change 44: 387-422 
Wheatcroft, Geoffrey. 2007. "Inside the Blair Psyche." The Daily Mail. 
White House Budget Tables. 2006. 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budgetlfy2006/tables.html 
Zegart, Amy. 2005. "September 11 and the Adaptation Failure ofU.S. Intelligence 
Agencies." 2005. International Security, 29:4, 78-111. 
